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ABSTRACT 
This study begins with the premise that no military is ever optimally configured 
for any conflict into which it enters. Therefore, the need for significant changes to 
doctrine, organization, and technology almost invariably arises. Significant changes do 
not come about easily in military organizations, especially during wartime. This study 
examines the underlying conditions necessary for making major changes during wartime. 
It first surveys the relevant literature covering both military and organizational change in 
order to build hypotheses about wartime change. It then develops a framework and 
typology with which to study change in the complex endeavor of a military at war. 
Finally, it uses the United States military’s experiences in World War II, Vietnam, and 
the Global War on Terror as case studies with which to test those hypotheses and derive 
conclusions about the conditions under which change can occur during wartime. 
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 The complexity of warfare is such that it is exceedingly difficult to adequately 
prepare a military force for every eventuality it might encounter once engaged with an 
enemy. Nevertheless, pre-war training can help improve the odds of success relative to a 
less prepared foe. A military’s capability to accurately assess changing conditions and 
adapt itself accordingly while engaged in combat may not prove to be the decisive factor 
in victory, but history shows that it helps. Perhaps more importantly, the ability to 
understand the need for and implement required changes is essential to turning around a 
losing effort and avoiding defeat. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is ultimately to advance our understanding of the 
changes militaries undertake during wartime. By examining successfully implemented 
changes to critical elements of doctrine, strategy, technology, and tactics within their 
applicable contexts, one can isolate key events or patterns that reveal the change 
mechanism at work.  It is through understanding the forces that enabled change—and 
perhaps those forces that prevented it when it was necessary—that one gains a greater 
understanding of how to reconfigure a fielded military, when reconfiguration is required, 
and how to increase the chances that reconfiguration will achieve its desire effects.  
C. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
1. Change 
Change, in the broadest sense, is simply the act of making something different. To 
accurately explain the forces and conditions that enable change, one must first necessarily 
define what is meant by “military change.” This definition must include the implicit 
assumption that for a military to initiate change during wartime, it does so with the 
purpose of improvement. Additionally, change occurs at all levels of conflict, but an 
attempt to identify and study every single recorded change taking place during a given 
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conflict would result in little useful information. The intent here is to understand the 
dynamics of change at all levels of war, and how one can affect the others.  
At the other end of the change spectrum, limiting the scope to grand-scale or 
"revolutionary" changes eliminates many instances of change worthy of study. In order to 
better define the types of changes that are of interest, this study imposes a threshold 
above which a change becomes “significant.” To that end, this study uses the following 
working definition of "significant" military change:  
Altering doctrine, tactics, technology, or organizational structure with the intent 
of better achieving a military's objectives.    
 It is the intent of the organization to improve its outcomes that is important in this 
definition. Change is initiated toward a specific purpose. Equally important is the 
implication of change taken on behalf of an organization or military unit. Though the idea 
or stimulus for the change may originate outside the organization, the organization itself 
must implement the change as a collective. 
2. Wartime  
What defines “wartime”? What constitutes “war” and when does it officially 
begin? Drawing these distinctions becomes particularly problematic when both 
“conventional” and “irregular” conflicts are compared, as they are in this study. 
Therefore, a the working definition of “wartime” includes the period of time between 
when the U.S. prepares to engage in combat against an enemy force and the point at 
which the conflict ends in decisive victory or withdrawal of American forces. The 
preparatory phase is important because it sets the baseline configuration with which the 
military will enter its first engagements against an enemy. The assumptions made during 
the preparatory phase necessarily affect the subsequent ease or difficulty to make 
subsequent changes. The emphasis of this study is then on the mechanisms by which 
change is carried out by a force whose attention is heavily occupied by enemy fire.  
3. The Levels of Warfare 
Warfare, like a corporate enterprise, is managed at different conceptual levels by 
different parts of the organization. Much as a CEO does not generally interface with 
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customers as part of his daily routine, the commander-in-chief never takes up arms 
against the enemy. Each relies on a hierarchical organization to achieve an endstate 
vision. Therefore, to establish a framework for this analysis, it is necessary to define the 
individual “levels” at which warfare is both managed and executed. The current joint 
doctrinal definitions are used here to distinguish each level of warfare.  
The strategic level of war is  
the level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, 
determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security 
objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve 
these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational 
military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use 
of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or 
theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and 
other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (Joint Publication 1-02, 
2008) 
The operational level of war is 
the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, 
and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational 
areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational 
objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to 
achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to 
bring about and sustain these events. (Joint Publication 1-02, 2008) 
And the tactical level of war is 
the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to 
achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at 
this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in 
relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (Joint 
Publication 1-02, 2008) 
While these definitions provide some clarity, the nature of warfare is such that rarely do 
changes implemented at one level yield effects solely at that same level. A change in 
overall war strategy will necessarily drive changes to campaign objectives and means—
the operational level—and perhaps also influence how exactly the ensuing battles are 
fought—the tactical level. The doctrine cautions: “There are no finite limits or boundaries 
between them” (Joint Publication 1-02, 2008).  
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Furthermore, changes implemented at one level are often preceded by discussions 
and decisions at levels above. What is critical to the discussion of the “levels” of warfare 
is the concept of management. Wars are indeed fought by military forces—those who 
engage the enemy somewhere in the battlespace—but are managed according each 
distinct level. There are no neat lines dividing the levels of war. Neither then, should one 
expect to see neat lines defining the boundaries between the level at which each change 
was implemented.  
Mintzberg and Westley (1992) argue that “Change in organizations occurs 
between levels as well as within levels. Conceptual clarity concerning the level where the 
change originates or is focused is essential if the process of change as well as its 
comprehensiveness and the triggers that evoke it are to be understood.” Therefore, each 
sample change presented in this study is assigned to a particular level—the one at which 
it was initiated, or put into action. The reason for this method of assignment is that 
ultimately, change is the sum of both an idea and its implementation. For an idea to 
persist through implementation, it will likely weather debate about its merit and attempts 
to defeat it. The level at which this debate occurs is where the factors that influence 
should be present.  
An example that will be used later is that of the battles fought among the 
hedgerows by the allies following the Normandy invasion in 1944. Changes made at the 
tactical level, in the form of equipment modifications, communications procedures, and 
combined-arms tactics all synthesized to enable the achievement of critical campaign 
objectives and ultimately influenced strategy (Doubler, 1994). Failure to make the 
incremental tactical changes would have kept the allies bogged down in Normandy, and 
would have forced a significant change in strategy as the allies came to the realization 
they could not push through German lines through France and on into Germany.  
As the term “doctrine” at times varies between authors, it is also necessary to 
“fix” a definition here. In the current joint publication literature, doctrine is defined as 
“Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their 
actions in support of national objectives” (Joint Publication 3-0, 2008). Doctrine, 
therefore, does not confine itself to a single level of warfare; in a broad sense it could be 
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considered to encompass the other two modes of warfare examined in this study: 
organization and technology. But for the purpose of this analysis, such an aggregation 
obfuscates the underlying factors that drive changes. Doctrine, then, is the set of 
fundamental principles on which an organization or service relies to achieve its given 
mission or stated objective. It is independent of level, but may impact all three. 
This study makes use of the two broad categories of external and internal 
conditions affecting military change. Pierce (2004) contends that understanding the 
external factors—the why and the when surrounding military innovation—is important, 
but the internal mechanisms by which such innovations are managed—the how—to 
achieve full potential are equally important.  
Commanders who implement change while engaged with an enemy incur 
significant amounts of real and/or perceived risk. This line of thinking generally 
correlates to an “organizational” perspective of change—that organizations internally 
process their strengths and weaknesses, identify both opportunities and threats, and make 
choices accordingly to achieve their objective. In theory, the better an organization is 
structured and led toward this end, the more successful it will be in achieving its desired 
goals. 
The corollary is the external perspective. With respect to military organizations, 
interactions with the enemy and the environment fall into the “external” category. The 
distinction between “internal” and “external” factors can be blurred, particularly if one 
takes the strict organizational theory perspective that how an organization responds to a 
highly uncertain environment—such as combat—is largely a result of its internal 
structure, leadership, etc. In that sense, most all changes would be the product of internal 
actions. However, as this study seeks to understand the underlying conditions—the 
influences—rather than the mechanics necessary for change, the distinction between 
internal and external is still useful to distinguish between those factors the organization 
can control (internal) and those that it cannot (external).   
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4. Typology 
To better understand the changes militaries make during conflict, they must first 
be classified. At the most basic level, Farrell and Terriff (2002) provide useful 
descriptions for the nature of how a change was initiated. They define three “pathways” 
to military change: (1) innovation is the development of new military technologies, 
tactics, strategies, and structures where none previously existed; (2) adaptation is 
adjusting existing military means and methods, simply changing what already exists; (3) 
emulation is the importing of new tools and ways of war through imitation of other 
military organizations, to include directly copying. This study adds a fourth “pathway” of 
change: abandonment.  Abandonment is the act of dissolving an existing organization or 
eliminating an employment concept. These four types of change aid in classifying and 
understanding the changes observed throughout this study. 
D. EXISTING THEORY 
Presented here are synopses of the most relevant theories regarding change and 
innovation, within both military and where applicable, organizational behavior literature. 
This body of theory will form the basis for the hypotheses used in this analysis.  
The preponderance of military change studies assign a level of significance to the 
change proportional to the magnitude of its respective outcome. For example, Farrell and 
Terriff (2002) focus exclusively on “major” changes, characterized by the development 
of new organizational goals, strategies, and structures.   
Posen (1984) draws his conclusions about the formation of military doctrines — 
or “how battles are fought” — by using organizational behavior and balance of power 
theories. He argues that during interwar periods, civilian intervention stems from either 
perceived opportunities or threats, and is required to overcome a military’s tendency 
towards stagnation. He also concludes that the balance of power theory is the more 
powerful instrument for explaining military change.  
Dupuy (1980) defines the necessary process militaries undertake in order to 
successfully implement anything new. Though his work focuses primarily on technology, 
its framework is broad enough that it may be applied to doctrine, organization, and 
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tactics. “Anything new” must follow a path consisting of three phases, each of which 
must be complete before that military achieves the full potential advantage offered by the 
new weapon or system: (1) invention, (2) adoption, and (3) assimilation.   
He also argues that historically, the numbers of inventions have increased 
exponentially and that the interval between invention and adoption has decreased 
significantly, but that the interval between adoption and assimilation — the interval of 
"effective use" — has not changed appreciably: approximately twenty years when the 
necessary conditions for assimilation have been present. When they have not been 
present, it has taken longer. His theory holds many implications for a military attempting 
to innovate or make major changes during wartime.  
According to Dupuy, wartime militaries must still pass anything new through 
these phases to achieve the desired results. To the extent it can complete this cycle, it can 
generate change. Dupuy’s argument implies that in order to succeed at changing 
something during the course of a conflict, there must exist a system to enable the 
completion of all three phases rapidly, achieving “assimilation” in sufficient time to reap 
the benefits of the new “thing.”  
Davis (1967) argues that a “zealot” must exist to champion an innovative idea, 
and though neither zealots nor ideas succeed on their own, there can be no progress 
without at least one of them. He also argues that the majority of proposed changes are for 
means to better accomplish existing tasks and not for revolutionary capabilities. Perhaps 
more importantly, he describes a common pattern of “counter-innovation.” In this pattern, 
a resistance movement forms at higher ranks, then expands downward to the lower ranks. 
Ultimately, the claim of excessive cost is used to attempt to kill the innovation, primarily 
because its enemies do not wish to be perceived as “non-innovative.”  
Avant (1994) argues that a specific organization’s structure, biases and culture 
must include leadership incentives — rewards or promotion — for innovation to occur. 
Mendeles (1998), building on the work of Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) puts forth the 
"Garbage Can Theory" of organizational behavior, that the proper alignment of effort,  
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time, attention, resources, expense, and good luck must align concurrently to enable 
technological innovations. While perhaps an accurate descriptor, the theory is of little 
practical explanatory use. 
Pierce (2004) builds on those theories of Posen, Rosen, Cote, and Kier, to develop 
the concept of “disruptive change” to military innovation, which is defined as “an 
improved performance along a warfighting trajectory that had not previously been 
valued.” He contends that disruptive innovations have historically had to be disguised 
initially as “sustaining” innovations (those that improved capability along an existing 
warfighting trajectory) to ensure their survival.  
Rosen (1991) defines military innovation as “a change in one of the primary 
combat arms of a service in the way it fights or alternatively, as the creation of a new 
combat arm.” He further frames the difficulties of military innovation as closely related 
to the fundamental characteristics of bureaucracies. He explains that large bureaucracies 
are not only “…hard to change, but…are designed not to change.” When military 
bureaucracies do manage to change, there is no universal explanation as to why or how. 
He argues that wartime innovations result from either the pursuit of inappropriate 
strategic goals or the misunderstanding of ongoing military operations and the goals they 
are supposed to achieve. Finally, he asserts that a military can innovate if organizational 
learning can take place “under the unique conditions of war,” as long as the 
organizational learning leads to a rethinking of the fundamental assumptions about how 
operations lead to victory. 
Unfortunately, he fails to elaborate about what “organizational learning” means to 
a combat organization during wartime. He does, however, acknowledge the problematic 
nature of defining organizational learning. Perhaps more importantly, he also observes 
that simply thinking about or dreaming up a better way to wage war is insufficient. 
Implementation is the other critical—and oftentimes, more difficult—component. 
Rosen’s work therefore suggests that in order to understand the conditions that enable 
military change, one must account for two critical components: (1) the development of 
the new idea or concept, and (2) the implementation process.  
  9
There are many competing theories about how organizations learn, what 
distinguishes “organizational learning” from a “learning organization,” and ultimately 
how useful the concepts and language are to improving organizational performance. 
Further theories center around whether it is composed of structural and cultural 
components (Lipshitz and Popper, 1998), or is the result of a delicate balance between the 
organization's efforts at exploitation and exploration (March, 1991). The development of 
diverse definitions and conceptual variance led to the description of the “mystification” 
of organizational learning (Friedman, Lipshitz, and Popper, 2005) and the observation 
that “The more organizational learning is discussed, the less clarity and agreement there 
seems to be about its very definition” (Berthoin-Antal, Dierkes, Child, & Nonaka, 2001,  
in Friedman, Lipshitz, and Popper, 2005).  
Indeed, so much definitional variation begs for an “integrated model,” which 
Örtenblad (2004) develops for the “learning organization.” He contends there are only 
four qualities required for an organization to be a “learning organization”: (1) learning at 
work; (2) organizational learning; (3) developing a learning climate; and (4) creating 
learning structures—all of which must be present. And none of which help better define 
the concept. His use of the term “organizational learning” as a quality of a “learning 
organization” is indicative of the many obfuscations present within the realm of 
organizational learning theory. In Örtenblad's (2004) “integrated model,” the term 
“organizational learning” specifically refers to the organization's characteristics of “being 
aware of the need for different levels of learning…the storing of knowledge in the 
organization…” and that it be “…actually used in practice.” Though it is more specific 
and simplified, it is not clear that Rosen is referring to this type of definition.  
The most relevant definition of organizational learning for the purpose of this 
study is that developed by Argyris and Shön (1978). They divide learning into two 
distinct categories: single-loop learning and double-loop learning. Both individuals and 
organizations can experience each type. Single-loop learning refers to error correction, or 
taking measures to return to a previous state. The classic example is that of a thermostat, 
which can take measures to return the temperature of a room back to that set by the user 
because it is configured to measure the temperature in the room—to receive feedback on 
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the state it is supposed to regulate. In an organizational context, error detection and 
correction that enables the organization to achieve its current objectives is single-loop 
learning.  
Double-loop learning occurs when error is detected and corrected in ways that 
involve the modification of an organization’s underlying norms, policies and objectives. 
It can only be achieved in an organizational setting when individuals are not only able to 
identify errors and corrections, but also able to synthesize a view of the problem area that 
enables them to develop a solution that alters the fundamental elements that led to the 
problem in the first place (Argyris & Shön, 1978).  
For example, the German reformulation of their fundamental way of warfare 
following the stagnant, bloody experience of World War I can be considered double-loop 
learning. Instead of making marginal improvements to their existing means — namely 
the static defense and individually-functioning combat arms — they endeavored to 
understand the fundamental nature of the problem and devised a solution — the 
combination of coordinated mass and speed known as Blitzkrieg.     
Innovations, therefore, should be the product of a military organization that had in 
place the personnel, structure and culture in which fundamental propositions about 
strategic objectives could be not only challenged, but overturned in favor of alternative 
ones—an organization in which double-loop learning could occur. Single-loop learning, 
on the other hand, should produce incremental changes along existing strategies and 
methods. However, as Rosen (1991) observes, simply thinking about new and improved 
methods of warfare is not sufficient by itself. In the end, militaries are organizations, 
even when at war. Combat organizations are subject to many of the same dynamics and 
challenges as other bureaucracies. Indeed, combat units have more incentive to resist 
change than do other types of organizations. As Air Vice Marshal R. A. Mason (1986) 
observes: 
In organized Western armed services, conformity, reliability, and 
teamwork have long been essential ingredients of esprit and confidence 
within the unit. Mutual dependence normally requires coordinated, 
predictable behavior from colleagues, whether in an infantry platoon or in 
a four-ship formation. The demands of teamwork tend to inhibit 
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independent action. Above the level of the fighting unit, further 
restrictions apply…when one reflects on all the factors militating against 
innovation in modern military affairs, it is astonishing that tactical and 
technical innovations ever take place at all. 
Therefore, some of the theory governing how organizations implement and 
manage change applies. The difficult questions are (1) which theories? and (2) how does 
one distinguish between applicable and non-applicable theory? The unique environment, 
temporal dimension, and “interaction” with competing organizations (i.e. the enemy) 
require a careful selection of theory governing organizations that function in highly 
complex environments under conditions of uncertainty.  
Fundamental to any organization's ability to change is its ability to identify the 
need to do so. Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) argue that an organization, in order to be 
capable of adapting to rapid, potentially catastrophic events must strive for a state of 
mindfulness, which is defined as “…hav[ing] a rich awareness of discriminatory detail 
and an enhanced ability to discover and correct errors that could escalate into a crisis.” 
Mindfulness results from possessing five specific traits: (1) preoccupation with failures 
rather than successes, (2) reluctance to simplify interpretations, (3) sensitivity to 
operations, (4) commitment to resilience, and (5) deference to expertise, as exhibited by 
encouragement of a fluid decision-making system (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).  
However, another argument advanced by Downs and Mohr (1976) suggests that 
there is no unifying theory of innovation, and that the study of innovation is characterized 
by the existence of distinct types of innovations whose adoption can best be explained by 
a number of correspondingly distinct theories. These theories may include different 
variables, or they may contain the same explanatory variables while positing different 
interrelationships among them and different effects upon the dependent variable. 
If it is not possible to develop unified theories of change, then what can one hope 
to have at the end of this study? The Minnesota Innovation Research Project provides 
perhaps the most comprehensive study of organizational innovation to date. The authors 
conclude that any good theory of innovation must be able to do four things: (1) explain 
how structure and individual purposive action are linked at local and global levels of 
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analysis, (2) explain how innovation and change is produced both by the internal 
functioning of the structure and by the external purposive actions of individuals, (3) 
explain both stability and instability, and (4) include time as the key historical metric—a 
change is a difference that can be noted only over time in an entity. Furthermore, the 
authors conclude:  
Based on the findings from the MIRP studies, we contend that a single 
theory cannot encompass the complexity and diversity of innovation 
processes. Instead, several different theories or models may explain 
innovation processes, and which theory holds depends on the context and 
conditions confronting a given innovation. This preliminary conclusion 
leads us to address the need for a metatheory of innovation process. (Van 
de Ven, Angle, & Poole, 2000) 
To that end, a metatheory—an overarching combination of theories—will result in the 
most comprehensive explanation of the underlying conditions that enable militaries to 
effect change, both during peacetime and combat.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This study makes use of a single case—the U.S. military—over time. Specifically, 
eight explanatory hypotheses are tested through the qualitative analysis of 64 significant 
wartime changes undertaken over the course of three conflicts: World War II, Vietnam, 
and Operation Enduring / Iraqi Freedom. Each conflict is first surveyed to identify and 
classify significant changes that occurred. It is not the intent of this study to capture every 
single major change across each branch of service and to joint warfighting—that would 
far exceed the scope of this analysis. Instead, this study makes heavy use of the historical 
literature to identify those significant changes that have come to be somewhat 
emblematic of their respective conflicts, and samples them accordingly. The primary 
research question of this study is:  
What are the underlying conditions necessary to effect significant change during 
wartime? 
To that end, this study seeks to uncover the stimuli, process, and context 
associated with each sample of wartime change. It draws on the empirical historical data 
and narratives of each conflict. In those instances where the means by which change was 
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achieved is sufficiently and unambiguously documented, the data is used. If no data 
exists, or there are conflicting accounts of how the change occurred, it was discarded and 
does not appear.  
In analyzing each instance of change, this study employs a simplification of the 
model of the change process developed by Lewin (1948) to understand what conditions 
enabled the change to occur and proceed through to implementation. Lewin described 
change in an individual or group beginning with an “unfreezing” of the existing situation, 
followed by the act of implementing the new condition, then a “freezing” of the 
organization in the new condition.  
1. Conflict Selection 
The conflicts were selected because each possesses four primary attributes: (1) 
they are sufficiently lengthy that long-term changes were undertaken during the conflict, 
(2) they are sufficient in length to evaluate the entire cycle of the changes, (3) they are of 
a magnitude sufficient to command significant national resources, and (4) there is enough 
unclassified material published about them to select sample changes and study them in 
the detail required for this analysis.  
Furthermore, each conflict has its own unique context that adds to the discussion 
and understanding of military change. World War II saw a somewhat reluctant United 
States pulled into two separate theaters of war, ultimately fully mobilizing its national 
resources. The sheer numbers of U.S. forces involved, the crystallization of national will, 
and burgeoning technology combined to create a massive force that developed its 
technology and doctrine as it fought its way across two geographically separate theaters. 
The Vietnam War, on the other hand, presents an entirely different backdrop for 
military change. American involvement began in an extremely limited role—primarily 
that of an advisory capacity. A focused counterinsurgency effort followed, which was 
eventually scrapped for a full-scale conventional war involving hundreds of thousands of 
American troops. Each phase of this war is unique, as are the factors and decisions that 
were made along the way—particularly in the greater context of tactical victories leading 
to strategic defeat.  
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Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) present 
the challenge of analyzing changes without having a definitive outcome against which to 
weigh them. Specifically, this study makes use only of operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. It does not address OEF operations in the Philippines, the Trans-Sahel, or the Horn 
of Africa, largely due to the author’s desire to keep the study unclassified and focused on 
those operations in which the preponderance of effort is military. Additionally, OEF-
Afghanistan (referred to as “OEF” for simplicity) and OIF are two distinctly different 
conflicts but for the purpose of this study are treated as essentially a single warfighting 
effort. This is because one conflict effectively served as preparation for the other and the 
same regional combatant commander (RCC) and staff lead them; indeed they have been 
waged simultaneously for all but the first 17 months of OEF.  
F. HYPOTHESES 
Hypotheses regarding the conditions underlying wartime change fall into two 
broad categories: internal and external. As change is seen as a product of decision or 
action by the military at a specific “level” of warfare the following hypotheses are level-
specific. The exception is the implementation of technological change. It does not fit 
neatly into one of the three categories and is separate. Technological change is a function 
of the military-industrial complex and a fielded military force’s ability to harness it, 
which effectively spans all three levels of warfare. Therefore, it has its own set of 
governing hypotheses. 
1. Internal 
At the strategic level, changes require a product champion: a proponent who 
understands the need or opportunity, and either has the authority to implement the new 
idea or is able to influence those who do.   
At the operational level, changes are planned and managed by the warfighting 
command to achieve the strategic objectives laid out by the national leadership.  
At the tactical level, significant changes result when the command relationship 
between the operational and tactical commanders is decentralized in nature.   
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Technological change is the result of procurement inertia—where pre-existing 
systems will be “sped” to the field to remedy deficiencies for which they may or may not 
have been designed.  
2. External  
At the strategic level, civilian intervention is required to implement significant 
changes.  
At the operational level, changes in capability emerge as a result of interactions 
with an enemy and the subsequent adjustments.  
Changes at the tactical level result after a unit experiences unexpected mission 
failure or higher than anticipated numbers of casualties.  
Changes to technology and technical systems occur because of a combat need: an 
existing deficiency or anticipated future requirement of the combat environment.  
 
 Internal External 
Strategic Product Champion Civilian Intervention 
Operational Planned Emergent 
Tactical Decentralized Command Unexpected Mission Failure or High Casualties 
Technological Procurement Inertia Combat Need 
Table 1.   Explanatory Hypotheses Summary 
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II. WORLD WAR II 
A. INTRODUCTION 
World War II provides a rich case from which to draw samples of significant 
changes undertaken during wartime. The history of World War II is well documented and 
numerous major changes are found within. One difficulty encountered during the 
examination of World War II (and indeed, during the next two conflicts) was to draw a 
line marking the start of U.S. involvement in the war. American policymakers began to 
view war with Germany inevitable in 1940, and started preparing according to what their 
predictions about that war would entail. Another difficulty is to assign significant 
changes specifically to the American military effort; many changes resulted from 
combined U.S.-British discussions and planning. In those cases where it is clear which 
country spawned the idea or led the initial effort, the appropriate country is credited.  
B. BACKGROUND 
During the late 1930s, much of Europe watched as an ascendant Adolph Hitler 
disregarded the limitations placed upon Germany by the Versailles treaty. Numerous 
nations prepared for war. Following the 1939 invasion of Poland, the United States 
remained isolationist, committing only matériel and moral support. As the remainder of 
Western Europe fell and Nazis peered across the English Channel, the U.S. remained 
committed only to the defense of Great Britain. Though many viewed entry into the 
widening war inevitable, it took the shock of the attacks at Pearl Harbor for the U.S. to 
commit to fighting the Axis powers militarily. 
Though the U.S. did not officially declare war until after the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, it did view the German aggression in Europe as an indicator of looming 
conflict. Additionally, German U-boats were interdicting American merchant ships well 
before the U.S. officially entered the war. Pre-war preparations began more or less in 
1940, and were based on the assumptions about what such a war—to be fought primarily 
in Europe—would involve. In this case, the changes the U.S. made in preparation for  
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conflict were based largely on its understanding of the enemy’s military actions, and are 
considered “wartime,” even though several occurred before America’s formal declaration 
of war. 
What distinguishes World War II from the other conflicts in this study is the 
totality with which the United States committed resources to the military effort. This has 
significant impact on the number of changes that take place over the four years of direct 
U.S. involvement. New equipment was designed and fielded almost continuously. 
Doctrine was tested repeatedly against enemies in multiple theaters. Organizations were 
formed and re-formed. If an idea could be formulated well enough to be proposed, it was 
likely that someone would investigate its feasibility.  
Finally, the nature of warfare waged during World War II embodied what we now 
consider “conventional” warfare—massed, mechanized forces competing to occupy each 
other’s territory and crush each others’ matériel capabilities. This is not to say that there 
was no use of “unconventional” or innovative means during World War II—there were 
many. Some, such as the operations carried out by the OSS’s Jedburgh teams have 
become legendary and heavily influenced modern “irregular” warfare thought. However, 
the preponderance of significant changes made during World War II involved adapting 
and integrating scientific advancement for military purposes.   
C. SAMPLE CHANGES 
The following instances of change are presented and analyzed not because they 
were the most significant, or yielded the greatest effects (though clearly some did, such as 
the atomic bomb). These changes were selected based on their unique position in 
reference to the mode (doctrinal, organizational, or technological) and domain (sea 
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Table 2.   Selected Changes for World War II 
 
The 26 changes presented are interrelated. In many instances, technological 
changes feed into larger doctrinal changes, as is the case with ASW doctrine. 
1. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
Changes to the U.S.’s approach to ASW span all levels and modes. However, the 
ASW doctrine in place when the U.S. began suffering its first merchant shipping losses in 
1942 can only be characterized as being the result of shortsightedness on the part of the 
U.S. Navy. This was not the first time the U.S. had experienced the interdiction of 
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merchant vessels at the hands of German U-boat submarines. The latter days of World 
War I were marked by the very same problem (Polmar & Allen, 1991). Regardless, the 
U.S. Navy’s solution was to seek out the U-boats and destroy them (Owen, 2007). The 
Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet at the time, Admiral 
Ernest J. King, insisted the U-boat threat be countered by traditional ASW forces and 
methods. He initially refused to institute mandatory convoys for merchant ships crossing 
the Atlantic (Shachtman, 2002) in spite of the fact that the British had previously 
successfully reduced their losses by instituting convoys and escort tactics—and shared 
their results with the U.S. Navy (Polmar & Allen, 1991).   
It is important to note that the ASW effort in the Atlantic directly competed for 
naval resources needed for the upcoming Pacific campaign. It was not until the spring of 
1942, amidst shipping losses approaching 100 vessels and over 500,000 gross tons per 
month that Admiral King became receptive to a suggestion for changes to Atlantic ASW 
strategy. At the suggestion of one of his staff officers, Captain Wilder D. Baker (U.S. 
Navy), King agreed to the establishment of a group to analyze the U-boat problem and 
make recommendations for improvement. As a result, the Anti-Submarine Operations 
Research Working Group (ASWORG)—loosely modeled after the British Operations 
Research (OR) organization—was formed within the National Defense Research 
Committee (Shachtman, 2002).  
The ASWORG completed an in-depth study of the U-boat problem with a focus 
on tactics, sensors, and weapons, and ultimately made numerous technological and 
tactical recommendations. Unfortunately, Admiral King was slow to order the adoption 
of new technology to the ASW problem, instead implementing only those technical 
improvements that contributed to the established “sub hunting” doctrine. In March of 
1943, after over a year of “uncontrollable” losses of allied shipping and extremely poor 
results from sub hunting, the Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, Dr. 
Vannevar Bush, personally lobbied President Roosevelt to order King to implement the 
remainder of improvements identified by the ASWORG; King agreed to make the 
changes (Shachtman, 2002).    
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Over the course of the next four months, the implementation of three key 
recommendations began to stem the hemorrhaging of matériel caused by the U-boat fleet. 
Improved patrol search tactics, high-frequency direction-finding (HF/DF) equipment and 
improved S-band (microwave) RADAR and improved anti-submarine 
weapons/munitions all combined with the breaking of the German radio traffic 
encryption to boost sharply Allied U-boat kills (Sternhell & Thorndike, 1946; 
Shachtman, 2002).   
Eventually, allied ASW efforts expanded to include the use of convoys, escorts 
(both aircraft and surface vessels), improved RADAR (aboard both ships and aircraft),  
medium bombers, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S. Navy’s Tenth Fleet—the 
“paper fleet” comprised of approximately 100 former ASWORG analysts and scientists. 
Tenth Fleet’s mission was to apply operations research and recommend further 
improvements. Furthermore, the breaking of the Enigma code by allied cryptanalysts also 
contributed to the ability to anticipate U-boat movements. By war’s end, German U-boat 
capability was sharply diminished by all of these improvements, plus the shift in doctrinal 
thinking from sub-hunting to “prevent[ing] enemy submarines from accomplishing their 
aim.” (Sternhell & Thorndike, 1946)  
2. SONAR 
One of the contributing factors to American unpreparedness for countering 
German U-boats was the pre-war belief that recent advances in SONAR and depth 
charges would keep the U-boat threat in check. The U.S.’s SONAR capability was 
actually provided by the British (whose system was called “Asdic”), and by late 1939 all 
American destroyers were equipped with a set (Polmar & Allen, 1991). Unfortunately, 
due largely to its extremely classified nature, SONAR was not adequately tested prior to 
the outbreak of war (Till, 1996). As a result, it was far less effective at detecting 
submerged U-boats than widely expected. Not only did the equipment have limitations, 
but the U-boat commanders quickly adapted their hunting tactics to attack from the 
surface, which prevented them from being acquired by SONAR. Additionally, the U-boat 
fleet was soon modified with acoustic sensors, which allowed U-boat crews to hear the 
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“ping” produced by the SONAR sets, and therefore gave the U-boat advance warning of 
an allied vessel searching. These two German developments negated the already limited 
capability of SONAR (Polmar & Allen, 1991).  
In an attempt to improve SONAR’s U-boat detection capability, both the British 
and U.S. navies made incremental improvements to their existing SONAR sets. In 1944, 
the British fielded an add-on transmitter/receiver with a shallower “look-down” angle, 
known as the “Q” attachment. The U.S.’s efforts at improving SONAR resulted in minor 
upgrades to the electronic circuitry. Neither effort made a significant improvement to the 
performance of SONAR against the U-boat (Gerken, 1986).  SONAR played a minimal 
role throughout the remainder of the conflict, largely due to the other, more effective 
technical and technological advances made in the field of RADAR and HF/DF detection. 
3. RADAR 
Once the U-boat fleet negated the advantage provided by SONAR, British forces 
began experimenting with ship-board and aircraft radars to search for surfaced U-boats. 
Their initial trials were largely unsuccessful due to the existing wavelengths being sub-
optimal for resolving surfaced submarine-sized targets. By the end of 1941, British 
scientists developed 10 centimeter wavelength (S-band) RADAR sets and began 
installation on fleet vessels. The British shared their advances with the U.S. Navy and by 
1943, S-band RADAR sets were widely in use aboard ships in both fleets (Sternhell & 
Thorndike, 1946).   
The primary effect this development had on the U-boat fleet was to deprive it of 
its ability to surface undetected at night, and therefore significantly hindered its attacks 
on merchant convoys. With their ability to attack from the surface all but eliminated, the 
Germans began developing a both a more advanced submarine (the Type XXI) that could 
carry out its entire mission without surfacing and a snorkel-like device that permitted 
existing U-boats to remain submerged but still be able to charge their batteries (Polmar & 
Allen, 1991). As it turned out, an advanced submarine was not necessary for the Germans 
to negate the Allied improvement, as the S-band RADAR was also used as a night 
targeting aid aboard on several models of aircraft—one of which crashed in German 
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territory in March of 1943. Seven months later, the Germans fielded a receiver capable of 
receiving the S-band, which provided the U-boat crews advance warning of approaching 
Allied ASW ships and aircraft. Soon thereafter, Allied developmental work began on yet 
another RADAR frequency band (X-band) in an attempt to regain the advantage (Gerken, 
1986).  
4. High-Frequency Direction-Finding (HF/DF) Systems (“Huff Duff”) 
Another technology adapted for military use by nearly all of the major powers of 
the time is radio direction-finding (DF) equipment. In the late 1930’s, the British 
successfully developed a system that could “DF” in the high frequency (HF) range—
providing a directional line-of-bearing to the radio source. U-boat crews transmitted at 
these frequencies because of they believed that it was not possible to “DF” an HF-band 
frequency (because their own scientists had been unable to accomplish it—a belief they 
held long after Allied ASW measure became noticeably more effective to U-boat crews). 
HF/DF systems were initially fielded in British coastal watch stations, but their 
effectiveness from land was limited. By 1940, shipboard sets were fielded, and by 1943, 
at least two escort ships in every Atlantic convoy were equipped with a set (Owen, 2007). 
Employing multiple shipboard HF/DF systems within a single convoy generated 
multiple lines-of-bearing to a U-boat radio transmission, which meant escorts could 
effectively triangulate a U-boat’s position and either steer the convoy clear or coordinate 
with an attack asset. The mere presence of an attacker caused the U-boat to submerge, 
negating its ability to attack (Polmar & Allen, 1991). HF/DF systems continued to be 
effective against U-boat crew throughout the Battle of the Atlantic largely due to the 
hubris of the German U-boat Command, which never did appreciably change its radio 
procedures or frequencies.   
5. Anti-Submarine Operations Research Working Group (ASWORG) 
ASWORG was established under the authority of the National Defense Research 
Committee (NRDC) on April 1, 1942. As previously noted, it was specifically designed 
to accomplish an analytical study of the German U-boat “problem” being faced daily by 
Allied merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic. U.S. Navy Captain Baker—who 
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persuaded the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to allow the NRDC to establish 
ASWORG—described the requirement of such a group to be staffed with top civilian 
scientists by quoting a memorandum circulated through the British Coastal Command. 
The memorandum advised recruiting not only those who have attained “the very best 
standing in science,” but also those with demonstrated analytical ability: “…gifted 
mathematicians, lawyers, chess players, etc.” (Sternhell & Thorndike, 1946).  
ASWORG represents one of the first uses of Operations Research (OR) to 
specifically define and provide solutions to Navy problems. It is noteworthy that the 
CNO initially resisted the initiative, largely due to his faith in the established anti-
submarine warfare doctrine in use at the time—and in spite of the mounting evidence of 
that doctrine’s inadequacy. This also would not be the last time an emulation of British 
ideas resulted in an effective wartime change. 
6. Naval Doctrine and the Aircraft Carrier 
During the course of the war, the aircraft carrier overtook the battleship as the 
U.S. Navy’s primary means of projecting combat power. This change was not due to any 
single individual, but rather a series of incremental improvements to aircraft ranges and 
armaments. As the U.S. Navy’s official post-war analysis concluded, the nature of 
warfare at sea evolved such that by war’s end, it was clear that “Control of the air was 
prerequisite to control of the sea.” Drawing on lessons from the Pacific theater, it further 
concluded that local control of the air permitted the landing of amphibious forces and the 
subsequent construction of facilities necessary to enable sustained strategic targeting of 
the enemy’s war making apparatus (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1947).   
At the outset of World War II, the warfighting potential of the aircraft carrier and 
naval aviation in general was largely underestimated (Till, 1996). Aircraft carriers had 
been initially integrated into the existing naval doctrine, primarily in the role of providing 
airborne scouts for the existing fleet concept. Through a masterful blending of political 
maneuvering, resource grabs, and the establishment of a new promotion pathway, 
Admiral James Moffett ensured carrier aviation continued to advance in spite of an 
existing culture that heavily embraced the battleship as the traditional center of sea power 
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(Pierce, 2004). He and a few other key officers believed in the enormous  potential of the 
carrier to dominate the seas, but on the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Navy 
operated only eight aircraft carriers—equal to the number of British carriers afloat and 
two fewer than Japanese (J. Ellis, 1993).   
The Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor no doubt affected the U.S. Navy’s view of sea 
power. Between December 7, 1941 and April 9, 1942, the Japanese carrier striking force 
sank five battleships, one aircraft carrier, one cruiser, and seven destroyers. More 
importantly, it had struck across an area one-third the earth’s circumference and had done 
so while rarely being sighted or effectively counterattacked (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 1947). During subsequent clashes with the Japanese fleet, only the American 
aircraft carriers could provide the reconnaissance and striking power to effectively 
counter and eventually defeat it. The production of new carriers was both increased and 
accelerated. By 1943, there were 50 carriers of three different types in service. By 
October 1945, the U.S. had placed in service 137 carriers (including those produced for 
and leased to the British Navy) (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations & King, 1946). 
While it could not have gained such a capability without the dedication and sacrifice of 
“product champions” like Admiral Moffett, the combat results achieved in the Pacific are 
what firmly entrenched the aircraft carrier into its prominence in the new naval order.  
7. Amphibious Operations Doctrine 
The U.S. entered World War II without an established capability to conduct 
complex amphibious assault landings. Although the U.S. Navy was aware of the 
difficulties inherent in amphibious operations, only the U.S. Marine Corps was 
sufficiently fixated on the problem to develop the doctrine necessary to address them. It 
was also, however, U.S. Marine Corps’ need to sufficiently differentiate itself and its 
mission from the Army that drove it towards amphibious operations. In 1933, shortly 
after the Department of the Navy remade the Marine Corps Expeditionary Force into the 
Fleet Marine Force, Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur renewed the 
argument for absorbing the Marines into the Army (Lorelli, 1995). The Marine Corps 
School, at the direction of Marine Commandant Ben Fuller, developed and published the 
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Tentative Manual for Landing Operations in January 1934. In 1938, the minimally 
revised document was adopted by the U.S. Navy and published as Landing Operations 
Doctrine. Soon thereafter, the U.S. Army adopted it verbatim; it was minimally revised in 
1941, 1942, and 1943, but the central principles laid out by the Marines in 1934 had been 
proven sound and were left intact (Lorelli, 1995).  
In October of 1940, President Roosevelt directed the Chief of Naval Operations 
and the Secretary of the Navy to develop a plan to cooperate with the British in the event 
the U.S. was to enter the war against Germany. The subsequent plan called for large 
numbers of American troops to be transported across the Atlantic to invade the European 
continent (Lorelli, 1995). Amphibious operations instantly became a critical component 
of Allied strategy in Europe.  
Unfortunately, the existence of a doctrine publication and a war plan do not make 
for military capability. Even though the commitment level of the Marines was high, the 
Navy was not configured to execute such amphibious assaults. Earnest preparations for 
amphibious war had begun some five years prior, in 1935. Each year the Navy and 
Marines conducted an amphibious exercise and each year, the same deficiencies in 
equipment, training and manpower were noted (Smith, 1992). It was not until the 
prospect of war loomed ahead that the acquisition of sufficient amphibious vehicles and 
additional forces was pursued. 
The Marines found themselves putting doctrine into practice in 1942. While far 
from perfect, the early amphibious assault on the island of Guadalcanal proved the 
fundamental concepts sound—in no small part due to the initial lack of enemy resistance. 
However, the amphibious force hit snags, even unopposed. The landings at the 
neighboring islands of Tanambogo and Gavutu provided the marines with their first real 
resistance, which varied from isolated sniper fire to coordinated fires from fortified 
positions along the landing zone. Among the key lessons absorbed from the protracted 
combat there was the importance of planning for adequate logistical support and the need 
for improved coordination with air support assets (Lorelli, 1995). 
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Perhaps the most punctuated lesson of amphibious warfare came not from direct 
combat but from the experience of the Canadian and British failed amphibious assault at 
Dieppe. The U.S. Marines had emplaced an observer with the force, whose observations 
would further improve the effectiveness of American amphibious assaults. Among them 
were (1) air superiority was a requirement; (2) the need for shore bombardment 
outweighed the need for surprise;  (3) shore-based naval gunfire spotters were necessary; 
(4) dive bombing was a superior tactic for reducing shore defenses; (5) successful 
withdrawal was a virtual impossibility for an amphibious force (Lorelli, 1995).  
Amphibious doctrine—like other doctrines of the period—evolved iteratively. 
With each successive battle, equipment and techniques were refined. During the earlier 
battles, such as at the bloody fighting at Tarawa, voluminous lessons were collected 
which resulted in numerous adjustments to critical components, such as communications 
plans, shore bombardment, and landing craft types and numbers, etc. (Lorelli, 1995). The 
fundamental concepts, however, did not change appreciably during the course of the war. 
Though experience generated improvements to equipment and tactics, the nature of 
amphibious operations was such that even after two years of conducting them, they still 
involved a high numbers of casualties against a prepared enemy.  
8. Amphibious Craft  
The six annual Fleet Landing Exercises conducted between 1935 and 1940 were 
characterized by the testing, experimenting with, and refining amphibious tactics and 
doctrine under conditions that represented the best the Marines could do to simulate 
combat. Each annual exercise was characterized by several limitations in available 
personnel and equipment, indicative of the relatively low priority given to amphibious 
craft operations within the U.S. Navy prior to the start of the war. Perhaps the biggest 
limitation the Marines and Navy faced upon entry into the war was the “…total lack of 
assault transport vessels, [and] the very limited number of landing craft…” (Smith, 
1992). This deficiency would soon be remedied, however, as landing and amphibious 
craft were reprioritized amongst the competing U.S. shipbuilding requirements. By 
August 1945, some 56,000 amphibious craft would be built (Ladd, 1976). 
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The existence of an amphibious ship capable of landing tanks directly on the 
beach was observed in use by Japanese forces and reported to the Department of the 
Navy by Marine Lt. Victor Krulak while serving in China in 1937. Not surprisingly, his 
report generated no action. Two years later, back in the U.S. and serving under General 
Holland Smith, Krulak carved a model of the landing craft he had witnessed in China and 
showed it to Smith. Smith took him and his idea to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
and the next two years would see numerous disputes between the Marines and the Navy 
concerning the details of the craft necessary for amphibious operations (Lorelli, 1995). 
Through sheer force of personality and tenacity, General Smith and his core of 
proponents succeeded in getting their ideas for ship designs into Navy inventory. 
However, it was not until both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill came to 
an agreement on overall strategy in Europe that the construction of sufficient amphibious 
and landing ships was reprioritized high enough to produce the required numbers of craft.  
9. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
In the years leading up to the second world war, the intelligence capabilities of the 
U.S. government were fractious and focused largely at internal espionage threats. Four 
primary agencies collected intelligence: the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and the Department of the 
Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MID). The overseas presence of these agencies 
was minimal, coordination amongst them was non-existent, and no reliable means existed 
for ensuring the most important intelligence was forwarded up the chain to the White 
House (O'Donnell, 2004). 
In an effort to improve the quality of the intelligence he received, President 
Roosevelt directed the establishment of the White House agency known as Coordinator 
of Information (COI). Its mission was to improve the analysis and dissemination of 
critical intelligence matters for the president. President Roosevelt chose retired General 
and practicing attorney William J. Donovan to lead the new office. Almost immediately, 
his authority and organizational mission were challenged by the existing intelligence 
agencies in an attempt to repel his invasion into what they saw as their “turf.” Donovan, 
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in an attempt to allay the distrust of the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested to 
the president that COI be transferred to report directly to the joint chiefs (O'Donnell, 
2004).  
Donovan’s proposal was accepted, and in June, 1942, COI was officially 
redesignated the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Donovan patterned the organization 
after the British intelligence and special operations community, to which he was given 
unprecedented access by Prime Minister Churchill. The functions of the OSS were 
carried out by divisions: Research & Analysis (intelligence), Research & Development 
(weapons), Morale Operations (subversive propaganda), Maritime Units (agent/supply 
transport and sabotage), X-2 (counterespionage), Secret Intelligence (covered field 
agents), Special Operations (sabotage, subversion, guerrilla warfare), and Operational 
Groups (sabotage an guerrilla warfare teams with language expertise) (O'Donnell, 2004). 
Over the course of the war, the OSS—under the tutelage of its British 
counterparts in MI-6, Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and Special Operations Executive 
(SOE)—pioneered what would become the institutional foundation for American 
intelligence operations for the rest of the century (MacPherson, 2003).  
10. Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) 
The OSRD was established by Executive Order 8807 on June 28, 1941 with the 
primary mission of “assuring adequate provision for research on scientific and medical 
problems relating to the national defense” (Woolley & Peters). As a follow-on 
organization to the former National Defense Research Committee (NDRC—which by EO 
8807 became subordinate to the OSRD) it was also concerned with the application of new 
science and technology applications for the defense of the nation. However, the OSRD’s 
charter also included several significant duties that indicate the kind of influence it, and 
its director, Vannevar Bush, wielded with the president. First, the director of the OSRD 
reported directly to President Roosevelt, allowing for significant bypassing of barriers to 
carrying out its mission. Next, the director was authorized to organize OSRD as he saw 
fit (he still had to get his department heads approved by the president).  
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Most significantly, the director had the authority to take over any contracts and 
obligations previously entered into by the NDRC. Effectively, the OSRD was given the 
authority to modify and manage previously existing contracts, seek out new scientific 
applications for defense and medicine, and mobilize the nation’s scientists to focus on 
wartime problems. The director had the access to the president that allowed him to apply 
pressure if needed to gain the compliance of the agencies involved—primarily the 
Departments of the Navy and War (Woolley & Peters). 
Vannevar Bush quickly organized OSRD into cross-functional divisions that were 
built to specifically address the unique warfighting and medical problems confronting the 
nation in 1942. One of the attributes that made OSRD so effective was Director Bush’s 
adherence to the principle of flexible organization; he organized by task, and hired 
specific expertise for each task as it evolved. As one might expect from this type of 
organization placed in a position of power, not everyone was thrilled about having the 
OSRD meddle in what they felt was their business (Shachtman, 2002).  
11. Airborne Doctrine and the Airborne Division 
The U.S. Army first explored the use of the parachute in the 1920’s, but after a 
series of inconclusive trials, the idea faded. It was after the Germans’ highly effective use 
of both parachute and glider-borne forces in 1940 that the U.S. Army grasped the 
potential utility of airborne forces. The War Department directed the formation of a 
parachute test platoon and ordered its commander, Major William Lee to assess means of 
delivering troops into combat through the use of the parachute (Weeks, 1978).  
By May 1941, the U.S. Army’s airborne capability consisted of one parachute 
infantry battalion. Furthermore, no doctrine existed to govern its employment. During 
pre-war exercises, the airborne was used as a suicide force, many times given no means 
or plan to link up with main forces during the operation. To make matters worse, the 
parachutes used during this period did not allow individual airborne soldiers to jump with 
their weapons on their person (Sheehan, 2003).  
It was only after the Germans won a hard-fought, airborne assault on Crete during 
this time period that the U.S. Army became serious about the employment of airborne 
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forces in support of strategic objectives. The perception among U.S. Army airborne 
proponents was that the German victory at Crete was easily achieved. In reality, it was a 
near catastrophe that caused the Germans to re-think their airborne employment doctrine 
(Sheehan, 2003). U.S. airborne capacity was rapidly expanded as a result. 
Beginning almost immediately following the German actions on Crete, the Chief 
of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, directed the formation of three more 
parachute infantry battalions. Following that, he established two experimental airland 
battalions. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, he authorized a total of six parachute infantry 
regiments, each composed of three battalions. Growth continued through 1942, until the 
U.S. Army had four airborne infantry divisions before Allied operations began at Sicily 
(Sheehan, 2003) 
The rapid expansion produced chaos. Airborne doctrine had yet to be fully 
thought-through, much less tested in combat. The air component of the airborne, the 
USAAF Troop Carrier Command (TCC) was chronically short of aircraft and new 
deliveries were slow to materialize. Therefore, it was difficult for newly formed airborne 
troops to exercise and refine their tactics and doctrine. In an effort to fill the gap left by 
aircraft shortage, the War Department elected to explore the use of gliders (Sheehan, 
2003). 
The airborne force tasked to jump into Sicily, which marked the first large-scale 
allied airborne employment, suffered all the symptoms of an ad hoc military unit. The 
most critical shortcomings were the lack of unity of command between the airborne 
ground force and the troop transports, and the lack of aircrew training for operations at 
night—when the assault occurred. Paratroopers landed as far as 60 miles from their drop 
zones in some cases, and the force was dispersed over Sicily in handfuls. They were 
forced to join up on the ground with whomever they could find and begin to conduct 
operations against the enemy. Adding insult to the lackluster airdrop, transport aircraft 
were fired upon multiple times by Allied naval forces operating in the vicinity (Sheehan, 
2003).  
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Though ultimately successful, the drop into Sicily provided numerous and 
significant lessons with which the airborne units could modify their doctrine and tactics. 
It also helped airborne proponents define the appropriate missions for such a force. 
Additions to the next revision of the airborne doctrine manual included prescribing the 
use of airborne troops in the enemy’s rear to create confusion and act as a diversion to the 
main force, the seizure and holding of key terrain arrear of organized beach defenses, and 
consolidating gains made until the arrival of the main force (Sheehan, 2003). 
Furthermore, the command relationships and procedures by which coordination was 
accomplished were improved. Specially trained pathfinder crews were designated to lead 
formations to ensure accurate placement of troops over the correct drop zones (Sheehan, 
2003). 
Much like the other doctrines presented in this study, airborne doctrine evolved 
through a cycle of trial-error-correction that persisted through the end of airborne combat 
operations. By 1944, Allied forces conducted corps-sized airdrops, and while they 
experienced difficulties, the airborne forces had effectively found their niche in 
combined-force operations and were employed accordingly. Furthermore, the procedural 
issues that marred the early drops were substantially reduced (Warren, 1956).  
12. The Glider and the Parachute 
The U.S. Army Air Force was effectively forced into emulating the German use 
of the glider as an airborne assault vehicle when the rapid expansion of the Army’s 
airborne forces outpaced the AAF’s transport aircraft procurement schedule. First used in 
combat in the 1943 assault on Sicily, the glider saw action through the remainder of the 
large Allied airborne offensives (Polmar & Allen, 1991).  
The primary U.S. combat glider was the Waco CG-4A. Though it proved 
effective at Sicily, the nature of the glider in general made it a sub-optimal choice for a 
combat transport vehicle. It was constructed out of steel tubing and covered with fabric, 
and therefore provided little to no protection to its passengers. Also, it had only one 
entrance/exit, which was the hinged nose. During a crash landing, the nose was invariably 
damaged, trapping the passengers and cargo inside (Warren, 1956). Despite its 
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limitations, the glider did possess one attribute in which it was superior to the parachute: 
troops and equipment were far less prone to the tremendous dispersion that paratroopers 
frequently experienced.  
13. Mounted Cavalry 
During the lead-in to the war, the Army had to determine what, if any, role the 
horse would continue to play in cavalry units. Many in the cavalry favored full 
mechanization, but others advocated a mixed horse and mechanized cavalry 
configuration. And of course, others advocated the sole use of the horse (Stubbs & 
Connor, 1972). Reconfiguration of the cavalry meant not only changing its mode of 
transport, but also of its doctrinal mission and how it integrated with the other combat 
forces.  
The decimation of Polish horse cavalry units in 1939 no doubt had an effect on 
the thinking of U.S. Army leadership at the time. The last Chief of Cavalry, Major 
General John K. Herr, testified before congress that some missions would be best 
accomplished using mechanized forces, others best accomplished by mounted forces, but 
“on the whole, the best results can be accomplished by using them together” (Stubbs & 
Connor, 1972). The paradigm shift from horse-mounted to mechanized was not a smooth 
one.  
Of the two cavalry divisions active during the war, only one—the First Cavalry 
Division—fought as a unit. It saw combat in the Pacific, but as dismounted infantry. The 
other was partially deactivated, served in North Africa (again, without horses or vehicles) 
and ultimately completely deactivated in 1944. The non-divisional cavalry units were 
completely mechanized during the war, and a period of significant organizational 
restructuring followed. At the same time, the War Department directed cavalry units to 
train primarily for reconnaissance missions employing infiltration tactics, fire, and 
maneuver. Subsequently, many cavalrymen felt the reorganization and change to mission 
severely wasted capacity to engage the enemy alongside the main force using armored 
vehicles (Stubbs & Connor, 1972).     
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14. Combined Arms Doctrine 
After witnessing the effectiveness of Germany’s combined-force offensive, or 
Blitzkrieg, the U.S. Army began to reconfigure its combat arms organizations. American 
armor capability at the time was minimal, but General Marshall ordered the completion 
of scores of tanks and the creation of the Armored Force. The first two armored divisions, 
created in July, 1940 consisted of an armored brigade composed of two regiments of light 
tanks, a regiment of medium tanks, a regiment of artillery (two battalions), and an 
engineer battalion. The infantry component of each division was a single two-battalion 
regiment of “leg” infantry and a motorized reconnaissance battalion (Corbett, 2001).   
However, armor units remained distinctly separate entities from infantry and 
artillery. Though some coordination and integration training was accomplished by forces 
taking part in pre-war exercises, the doctrine of the U.S. Army looked much like it did at 
the end of World War I. Combined arms units did not exist, and combined arms missions 
were difficult to coordinate or standardize. The first step towards remedying this situation 
came during the fighting in Normandy, where each branch served a useful purpose in 
support of the other. Infantry swept ahead of the armor to screen for fortified positions. 
Armor and artillery provided the necessary firepower with which to destroy fortifications 
and therefore advance. As the fighting continued, the ad hoc doctrine was gradually 
replaced by best practices. These lessons were eventually compiled and formalized into a 
doctrine publication in November, 1944 (Corbett, 2001). 
15. The Bazooka 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower named the bazooka as one of the four key 
weapons that helped most to win the war (Polmar & Allen, 1991). It is not surprising, 
then that the innovation of the bazooka was not the product of an Army development 
process. Instead, the idea came from a colonel and rocket-hobbyist working alone at the 
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, trying to make small rockets militarily useful. He initially 
succeeded to the point of being able to shoulder-fire a small rocket (Weeks, 1975).  
The problem was no suitable warhead existed that could do significant damage to 
an armored target. That is, until a Swiss designer developed a hollow-charged grenade in 
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1940 and later brought it to the U.S. in hopes of selling the design (the British had 
already turned it down). When combined with rocket propulsion, it could disable an 
armored vehicle. Furthermore, it was simple, relatively lightweight, easy to aim, and 
highly effective. Once the prototype had been demonstrated on a test range, the 
commander of Ground Force Development ordered it into pilot production without 
further tests. Soon thereafter, in May 1942, General Electric was put on contract to 
produce 5,000 units within 30 days (Weeks, 1975). Another, more ominous indicator of 
its utility was the fact that the Germans captured a bazooka from the Russians and 
subsequently copied it, producing a weapon called the panzerfaust (“tank fist”). By the 
end of the war, 476,628 bazookas and 15,603,000 rockets had been produced 
(Chamberlain & Gander, 1974). 
16. Hedgerow Warfare 
Following the tremendous effort to establish a foothold at Normandy in 1944, 
Allied forces found themselves unable to proceed inland and continue their advance 
across France towards Germany. Hindering their progress inland was a unique 
combination of enemy and terrain for which they were thoroughly unprepared. The maze-
like terrain features consisted of earthen berms supplanted with vegetation—hedgerows 
used by farmers to divide land and prevent soil erosion—provided German defenders 
excellent cover and concealment. They all but stopped off-road tank movement, and 
prevented Allied forces from being able to observe (and therefore adjust) mortar and 
artillery fire (Doubler, 1994).  
Progress through the Normandy hedgerow system was so slow, it took General 
Bradley, the First Army commander, a full 30 days longer to advance his forces inland to 
the vicinity of St. Lo than Allied planners had estimated prior to the invasion. In 
retrospect, those involved identified two other factors besides the terrain that slowed their 
progress: the tenacity of the German defenses and problems with their own organizations 
(Doubler, 1994). By the end of June 1944, infantrymen in the First Division were 
clearing one hedgerow field at a time, advancing a few hundred yards through each one,  
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many times in narrow columnar formations. Commanders quickly became painfully 
aware of the deficiencies in their own combined-arms coordination procedures and 
training.  
The key to gaining the advantage in the hedgerows, or bocage, was to regain the 
ability to maneuver supporting armor quickly and place effective firepower on the 
German defensive positions. Dozer tanks were effective at pushing through the 
hedgerows, but First Division had only four such tanks. One unit, the 747th Tank 
Battalion (assigned to the 29th Infantry Division), did not possess the dozer variant; 
instead its men improvised explosive charges to blow gaps in the hedgerows large 
enough to drive tanks through. Unfortunately, the number of hedgerows, tanks, and size 
of explosive required to create gaps large enough combined to create an enormous 
requirement for explosives—one that could not be supported. As a result, one member of 
the 747th came up with the idea to bury the explosive in the berm, which required less 
explosive to achieve the same results. 
As digging and burying explosives in root-strewn berms was time consuming and 
extraordinarily dangerous when done under fire, a tank crewmen improvised a 
mechanical device that enabled M4 “Sherman” tank crews to simply ram a hedgerow 
berm and gouge out a hole for the explosive charges. As their advantages became 
apparent, these improvised modifications both spread in use and increased in 
sophistication and functionality. Larger, toothed bumper-like devices fashioned out of 
scrap iron salvaged from German roadblocks became commonplace. Eventually, General 
Bradley got word and attended a demonstration, after which he immediately ordered the 
production of as many hedgerow-cutter devices be produced as possible (Doubler, 1994). 
Equipment modifications alone were not sufficient to overcome the advantage of 
the defenders. Coordination required between infantry units and tanks was previously 
unimportant; in the bocage, it became critical as tankers and infantrymen attempted to 
coordinate their movements through the confined spaces of the hedgerows. Following a 
failure to breach German lines and the loss of four tanks on July 20, the 29th Division’s 
leadership fell back and re-thought its approach to the problem. Several changes were 
proposed and attempted in an effort to improve coordination. Tankers added interphone 
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modifications to allow infantrymen to talk to a crew inside a tank without exposing 
themselves to hostile fire. Infantry units procured additional compatible radios. Most 
importantly, infantry and tank units began to rehearse coordinated action behind the front 
lines of advance, developing hand signals and refining their tactics as they went 
(Doubler, 1994).  
Several more changes had to take place before a sufficient advantage existed to 
overrun German positions consistently. They included the use of aerial-observed artillery 
fire and the further refinement of combined armor-infantry tactics (Doubler, 1994). What 
is significant about this example is that by themselves, the individual changes made 
within First Army would not have likely been effective enough to make a significant 
difference in the pace of the Allied advance. It was only through the continuous 
experimentation and refinement that solutions presented themselves, or emerged, from 
distilling the results of actions against the enemy. Furthermore, battalions and divisions 
developed their own solutions to their unique deficiencies. To be sure, the Allies would 
have likely been able to push enough men and tanks towards the problem that they would 
have eventually made it through hedgerow country. The “hedgerow combat doctrine” 
developed in Normandy may not have been decisive, but it no doubt hastened what could 
have been a much more costly advance in terms of both time and lives.  
17. Close Air Support 
At the outbreak of World War II, airpower doctrine had drifted significantly from 
that of “close support” to ground forces that had evolved during World War I. The 
mission of supporting ground forces was still paid lip service by the Army Air Corps 
(later the Army Air Force—AAF), and in practice the capability was non-existent. By 
1941, U.S. and Allied airpower was heavily committed to the doctrine of strategic 
bombardment (Syrett, 1990). Subsequently, as U.S. tactical air units entered the war in 
1942 in support of the ground campaign in North Africa, the initial results were dismal. 
To make matters worse, senior commanders of the air and ground components heatedly 
debated the issue of exactly who should be in command of aircraft executing strikes on 
targets required by—and in close proximity to—ground forces.  
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In an attempt to provide some guidance to those dealing with the problem of how 
best to go about supporting ground operations with airpower, the War Department 
published FM 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces in April of 1942, which was 
based largely on the experience of the Allied operations in Europe prior to American 
entry into the war. The War Department also formed new organizations, the air support 
commands, to specifically carry out the mission of supporting ground combat (Syrett, 
1990).   
The concept of the air support command was the first step towards creating an 
effective Allied close air support capability—it effectively formalized the notion that air 
operations in support of ground forces were important enough to dedicate a portion of the 
theater’s aircraft to them. However, this organizational change was far from sufficient on 
its own. Multiple supporting air “commands” existed within the same theater, several of 
which fell directly under army ground commanders, such as the XII Air Support 
Command, which was subordinate to Major General George S. Patton, Jr., Commander 
of the Western Task Force. To make matters worse, the coordination mechanisms spelled 
out in FM 31-35 relied heavily on airmen placed in liaison positions at key levels of the 
ground force’s chain of command, but ultimately left the approval of air support missions 
in the hands of the ground force commanders (Syrett, 1990). The net result was highly 
uncoordinated air attacks against targets of sometimes questionable priority.   
Most airmen saw the need for centralization. Key among them were Major 
General James Doolittle, commander of Twelfth Air Force, and Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Arthur Tedder, Air Officer Commander in Chief, Middle East. Conversely, ground force 
commanders believed the only way to increase the effectiveness of close support 
missions was to place all air support aircraft directly under the command of their 
supported ground force commander. The squabbling between commanders did little to 
improve the situation. Lieutenant General Dwight Eisenhower, as the Supreme Allied 
Commander of Operation Torch, was well aware of the poor performance of airpower 




Spaatz commander of all Allied air forces in Algeria and Tunisia. Spaatz, in turn, 
reapportioned more assets to the XII Air Support Command in hopes of improving close 
air support results. 
However, effective coordination and tactical results remained elusive, and, 
following a meeting with General Eisenhower, Spaatz created Allied Air Support 
Command in an effort to exercise centralized control of limited close air support forces 
(Syrett, 1990). Subsequently, centralization enabled airmen to systematically assess 
requests, prioritize missions, and adjust them accordingly as the next day’s efforts 
proceeded from planning to execution. Centralized control was, however, just the first 
step.  
18. The Roles of Airpower 
During the maelstrom of debate that surrounded the development of Close Air 
Support and the “proper” role of airpower, several key propositions about the 
employment of airpower resulted. As with any constrained resource, there must be a 
guiding method governing how its use is most efficiently directed. After many failed 
attempts, Allied commanders finally embraced three key roles for airpower: strategic 
bombardment, air superiority, and close support of friendly ground troops.  
The significance is that the AAF finally embraced a doctrine that was proven 
effective in battle, but it was not codified in an actual FM until 1945. Again, many beliefs 
held by both air and ground commanders prior to the outbreak of war were proven false, 
and the entire premise had to be re-thought, argued, and re-formulated while fighting one 
of the largest combat actions in world history. On more than one occasion, the debate had 
to be decided by the Allied theater commander himself. In these instances, those 
arguments that could be backed up by recent combat results carried the day. 
It is clear the heavy emphasis on strategic bombardment within the AAC that 
developed in the pre-war years was very much a survival strategy for the airpower 
advocates. They simply needed a unique capability that would allow them to argue the 
need for increasing resources and—in the opinion of some—the need for a separate 
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military service. It is also clear that the nearly singular focus on strategic bombardment 
guaranteed an air component that was capable of little else at the outbreak of the war.  
19. Daylight Precision Bombing 
The strategic bombardment of German war manufacturing capacity was the 
default strategy of the U.S. Army Air Force—a foregone conclusion reached before a 
single U.S.-piloted bomber had touched down on an English airfield. In March 1941, the 
air campaign plan completed for the eventual entrance of the U.S. into the European 
theater—known as Air War Plans Division-1, or AWPD-1, for short—called for a 
strategic bombing campaign against Germany and Italy. Noticeably absent was the 
mention of support to or combined operations with either the army or navy. AWPD-1 
was built with the belief that airpower would bring the German war machine to its knees 
by itself (Stokesbury, 1986). 
It would be almost two years from that point until American bomber crews got the 
chance to put concentrated strategic bombardment into practice. The necessary diversion 
of air assets to support operations in North Africa had set Eighth Air Force and its 
commander, General Ira Eaker significantly behind schedule. During the wait, the small 
numbers of American crews executed small raids into France and generally got oriented 
to the theater. One must also assume that they witnessed the British strategic bombing 
effort—partially executed with American-supplied B-17s—and its subsequently dismal 
results throughout 1941-42. At the end of 1941, Royal Air Force Bomber Command 
began a scientific study of the effectiveness of their preceding bombing efforts. Its results 
concluded that fewer than one in three bombs dropped on German soil fell within five 
miles of their intended targets. The study highlighted the weaknesses inherent in the 
British doctrine of nighttime, “precision” (that is, aiming at singular structures instead of 
spreading bombs out over an area) bombing and raised serious doubts about Bomber 
Command’s efficacy (Stokesbury, 1986).   
Nevertheless, Eighth Air Force believed it could achieve what the British could 
not, and continued with its plan of strategic bombing against German industry. What set 
the Americans apart—at least in their minds—was their technology: the U.S. version of 
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the B-17 had roughly twice the defensive capability of the export version and more 
importantly, it was equipped with the Norden bombsight, a device believed at the time to 
be a decisive advantage (Stokesbury, 1986). The Americans would not need the cover of 
darkness, as the superior defensive capability of the B-17G would be sufficient to keep 
losses to a minimum, even in daylight.  
Following costly early missions over France in early 1943, the commander of the 
First Bomb Wing, General Haywood Hansell, attempted to improve his wing’s results 
and reduce casualties by convening key commanders and aviators following each day’s 
missions. Hansell was committed to learning from the experiences that were costing lives 
and machines. He recognized the key to learning quickly was “absolute honesty,” and 
any topic was open for discussion except the abandonment of precision daylight bombing 
(Griffith, 1999). As one of the architects of AWPD-1 (and later AWPD-42, the updated 
combined war plan) Hansell was simply too invested in daylight precision bombing and 
what he believed possible through strategic bombardment to consider any other options at 
the time.  
Deep-penetration raids into Germany began in August 1943 and continued 
through October. The losses inflicted on the bomber fleet by the German air defense 
network and the Luftwaffe were extremely high, and quickly recognized as 
unsustainable. One raid, executed October 14 against the industrial city of Schweinfurt, 
resulted in 60 bombers out of 291 airborne being destroyed. The loss of 600 aircrew in a 
single day punctuated the realization that bombers could not fly unescorted over 
Germany in daylight (Stokesbury, 1986).   
Two significant changes were made in an effort to improve bombing results. The 
first was the switch from “precision” to “area” bombing tactics by the British. The second 
change came about with the completion of the P-51 “Mustang.” Previous attempts to 
escort the B-17s with the longest-range, drop-tank equipped fighter available—the P-47 
“Thunderbolt”—were only marginally successful, as the stout P-47 could not reach 
targets deep in Germany, and the Germans knew precisely where the escorts had to turn 
back (Stokesbury, 1986). In June 1943, U.S. Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert 
A. Lovett, returned from a visit to Eighth Air Force headquarters, and ordered the 
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acceleration of the P-51 into service. It flew its first escort mission six months later, in 
December, and subsequent bomber loss rates dropped from 9.1 percent per mission to 3.5 
percent (Polmar & Allen, 1991), effectively enabling the bombing campaign to continue 
attriting German production capacity.  
The doctrine of precision daylight bombing was the default answer to what 
American airmen viewed as the critical task at the time of entry into the war: to strike at 
the heart of Germany in an effort to crush its national will to fight. What is remarkable is 
the sheer number of bombers and crews that had to be lost before a change in doctrine or 
technology was sought. In essence, the strength of the idea put forth by those airpower 
pioneers who effectively staked the future of an independent air force on its ability to 
wage war by itself could only be swayed by operational results so poor and costly that 
their very existence was threatened.   
20. Norden Bombsight 
Though widely thought of as the U.S. bomber fleet’s “secret weapon,” the Norden 
bombsight was first fielded on U.S. Navy aircraft in 1931. It was not until 1941 that it 
was adopted for use by the U.S. Army Air Force and eventually installed on about three-
fourths of the U.S. bomber fleet (L. Searle, 1989). While the bombsight marked a 
significant step forward in solving the fundamental problems with accurately placing 
bombs on target from high altitudes, the secrecy and hype that surrounded it were far 
more effective at keeping it in service than was its actual performance. As it was based 
on high-power optical lenses, it was ineffective if the target was obscured by clouds—an 
obvious problem for operations taking place in Europe. In addition, the accuracy of the 
bomb delivery required a straight, non-maneuvering final leg to be flown to the target, 
which was easily attainable in training but many times impossible in combat due to 
enemy fighters and flak (Shachtman, 2002). 
The true significance of the Norden sight is that due to its highly classified 
existence, the effects of its accuracy (or lack thereof) were never truly understood until 
after the war. At the time, it was believed to be one of the U.S.’s key advantages and its 
“Top Secret” classification prevented a more objective assessment. Another key factor 
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keeping the Norden sight in use was the fact that a superior competitor bombsight, 
produced by Sperry, was even more classified and therefore even less well known. 
Indeed, the very fact that Sperry had produced a bombsight was classified “Top Secret” 
and known only to a handful of the company’s own employees (L. Searle, 1989). Thus, 
the combination of critical operational assessment data, over-classification, and the 
“mythical” status of the bombsight itself prevented any serious effort to attempt to 
improve on the Norden bombsight.  
21. Nighttime, Low-Level Incendiary Bombing 
Following the evolution of bomber tactics and doctrine in Europe from 1941-
1943, General Curtis Lemay was determined to improve the results and further “prove” 
the worth of strategic bombardment in the Pacific theater in 1944. Due to its superior 
range, the newly produced B-29s were dedicated to the Pacific bombing campaign 
against the Japanese mainland. Operations were launched first from China in June 1944, 
and six months later, they were begun from newly constructed airfields on the Marianas 
islands. By January 1945, both B-29 units were conducting operations against specific, 
strategic targets during daylight, and both units were achieving poor-to-marginal results 
(T. R. Searle, 2002).  
There was very real fear that the failure of the B-29 to achieve any significant 
strategic results against the Japanese amounted to yet another indictment of the validity 
of strategic bombardment. The Chief of the Army Air Force, General Henry H. Arnold, 
fired the commander of the Mariana operation, General Hansell, then consolidated the B-
29s from China to the Mariana Islands and charged General Curtis LeMay with getting 
results from the B-29 fleet (T. R. Searle, 2002).  
After two months of no significant change, General LeMay tried switching to 
incendiary bombing—perhaps based on his previous experience in the European theater. 
He directed changing the weapons payload but keeping the high-altitude delivery profile. 
The results were only slightly better. By March 1945, LeMay realized the high winds 
aloft made effective use of the Norden bombsight impossible, and directed a switch to a 
low-altitude, single-file procession of B-29s across a target city using incendiary 
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weapons. To negate the additional threat of the low-altitude attack, he dictated the 
missions be flown at night (T. R. Searle, 2002).   
The results were devastating. A firestorm begun initially in the Shitamachi district 
of Tokyo ultimately burned 16 square miles of the city to the ground, producing an U.S. 
estimated (and acknowledged to be low) 80,000 casualties. LeMay continued the practice 
until his force was out of incendiaries. Eventually, bombers dropped leaflets first, 
warning of such an attack. This allowed the population to leave the city before it was 
devastated by the bomber force  (Stokesbury, 1986).  
Notably, General LeMay felt the need to keep his change in tactics a secret from 
his superiors prior to the mission—presumably due to the fear he would be overruled and 
prevented from implementing them. He was only able to bring about this change after he 
took personal risk by eschewing the established doctrine. 
22. Unmanned Bombers 
In an effort to stem the loss of life in the air during the strategic bombardment 
campaign, the USAAF undertook a project to deliver ordnance to key strategic targets by 
remotely piloting bombers. Project Aphrodite used both remotely piloted U.S. Navy 
Catalina and USAAF B-17 medium bombers. The basic concept was that a minimal crew 
got the plane airborne, but then bailed out before crossing the English Channel. The 
unmanned aircraft was then flown remotely by a pilot in another B-17. The remote 
bomber, laden with upwards of 25,000 pounds of explosives, would then be steered 
directly into a heavily-defended target (McDaid & Oliver, 1997). 
All totaled, 12 attempts were made at attacking German V-weapons sites with 
Project Aphrodite aircraft. Only three made it to the vicinity of the target and each caused 
relatively little damage. The remaining nine exploded enroute, uncontrollably 
disappeared, or were shot down by German defenses in the target area. During the 
handful of combat trials, several aircrew lost their lives due to malfunctioning remote 
aircraft (Armitage, 1988). The project illustrates the lengths to which the U.S. would go 
in an attempt to reduce the number of bombers being lost during the combined bomber 
offensive.  
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23. Marine Raiders 
In February 1942, two battalions of U.S. Marines were designated “Raider 
Battalions”—the First and Second–by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major 
General Holcomb (Hoffman, 1995). How the Commandant reached the decision to create 
the battalions is somewhat complex. No fewer than three individuals, working separately, 
made appeals to their respective “higher-ups.” The first, Captain James Roosevelt, the 
President’s son, wrote to General Holcomb to urge the creation of a commando unit 
capable of waging guerrilla warfare—similar to that which Roosevelt’s friend, Major 
Evans Carlson (USMC) had witnessed in China as an observer there in 1937. At the same 
time, William Donovan, later to become Director of the OSS, wrote to President 
Roosevelt about his idea to create a unit capable of guerrilla warfare and assisting 
partisans behind enemy lines. And finally, Major General Holland Smith, USMC, and 
commander of Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet (AFAF) developed the concept by 
designating a single Marine battalion a “special battalion,” and subsequently using it to 
stage landings to seize key terrain in advance of a main amphibious force. In early 
January 1942, General Smith wrote to the Commandant requesting he re-designate the 
battalion in recognition of its special purpose (Hoffman, 1995). 
 One can only speculate that the suggestions of two distinguished Marines 
combined with the interest of President Roosevelt made the decision to create the two 
battalions an easy one. The only resistance—albeit short-lived—to the idea came from 
General Holcomb himself, whose initial response back to Captain Roosevelt suggested 
that existing Marine units could accomplish the proposed missions (Hoffman, 1995). 
The Raiders saw their first combat on Makin Atoll in the Gilbert Islands in 
August 1942. Raider Battalions would see combat throughout the Pacific, to include the 
campaigns in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, primarily operating in support of 
Marine Divisional assaults. However, the Raiders gained notoriety for executing daring, 
autonomous raids and guerrilla campaigns behind Japanese lines. The Raiders would 
eventually expand to four battalions, but in February, 1944 the Raider battalions were 
combined and converted from “Raiders” into the Fourth Marine Regiment, its mission 
and composition that of the standard regiment of the time (Polmar & Allen, 1991).   
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24. Long-Range Escort Fighters 
When General Spaatz asked Hermann Goering, soon after his capture, when it 
was that he first realized that the Nazis were defeated, Goering replied, “When I saw your 
bombers over Berlin protected by your long-range fighters, I knew then that the 
Luftwaffe would be unable to stop your bombers. Our weapons plants would be 
destroyed; our defeat was inevitable” (Frankland, 1968). Though obvious now, the 
solution to the problem of the Luftwaffe and its devastating effects on Allied bomber 
formations was anything but obvious in early 1943, when the Combined Bomber 
Offensive was just getting underway.  
The first attempt at reducing bomber losses took the form of increasing the armor 
and firepower of a handful of B-17s and B-24s in the belief these “escorts” could protect 
the bomber formations. The results were “disappointing.” Subsequently, similar 
employment  suggestions were made about both B-25s and B-26 medium bombers, but 
were rejected by Eighth Air Force (Boylan, 1966). It was not until March1943, that a 
fighter capable of escort arrived in theater—the P-47 “Thunderbolt.” 
The P-47 also had a somewhat limited range, though it was better than the 
existing P-39s and P-40s it was designated to replace. Even before the P-47 arrived in 
theater, Eighth Air Force staff raised concerns about the need for a drop-tank capability 
to extend the range of the fighter. Difficulties in coordination with supplying units in the 
United States and confusion resulted in slow production and delivery. It was not until the 
spring of 1944 that drop-tank production matched demand (Boylan, 1966). In the 
meantime, P-47s escorted bomber formations along portions of the routes to their targets, 
but had to turn back before the bombers did due to fuel constraints (especially during 
missions deep into Germany). The Luftwaffe knew the combat radius of the P-47, and 
simply waited beyond the range for the bomber formations (Stokesbury, 1986).  
In June 1943, Assistant Secretary of War, Robert Lovett, returned from an 
inspection trip to Eighth Air Force and promptly informed the Chief of the Air Force that 
fighter escort was the only effective means by which to protect bombers. He also 
indicated that the P-47 could be suitable, if only it was fitted with drop-tanks. Lovett’s 
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news, combined with mounting bomber losses during the first half of 1943 resonated with 
General Arnold. He immediately directed his Chief of Staff that “…by January, ’44, I 
want a fighter for all of our bombers from U.K. into Germany” (Boylan, 1966). 
Modifications to the P-47 configuration continued, to include 75-gallon and 200-
gallon varieties, but the extra range produced was still not enough to escort bombers deep 
into Germany. In November 1943, shortly after two disastrous raids against Bremen and 
Schweinfurt, twin-engine P-38 “Lightnings” arrived in England and improved the escort 
capability but were small in number. After the October losses, General Arnold directed 
all P-51s coming off the production line be sent to England, and by December 1943, the 
P-51 (equipped with two 75-gallon drop-tanks) was in combat (Boylan, 1966). Proof of 
their effectiveness came in February, as P-51s escorted bombers deep into Germany in a 
maximum effort against German aircraft manufacturing, known as “Big Week,” during 
which bomber losses were held to a minimum.  
25. Air Commandos 
As with so many airpower initiatives of World War II, the Air Commandos grew 
out of the ideas of General Henry H. Arnold. The original requirement for support to 
British General Orde Wingate’s irregular fighters operating in China was narrowly 
specified as resupply and evacuation of his wounded. However, Arnold viewed the 
situation as yet another opportunity to advance the cause of airpower. He expanded the 
concept initially to include the provision of a small strike force, but soon after told his 
chosen leaders for the task force, Lieutenant Colonels Alison and Cochran, to “go over 
and steal the show” (Boltz, 2001). 
The secret unit known only as “Project 9” grew to approximately 450 people and 
acquired CG-4A troop gliders, P-51s, L-1/5 light observation aircraft, C-47s, UC-64 
transports, B-25s, and YR-4 helicopters. By January 1, 1944 the unit—re-designated the 
5318th Provisional Air Unit—had arrived in India. Soon thereafter, they were re-
designated the First Air Commando Group, and began preparations for what would be the 
covert invasion of Burma to interdict Japanese supply lines (Boltz, 2001).  
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D. ANALYSIS 
Table 3.    Level of Effects and Nature of Changes 
 
In analyzing the changes made by the U.S. military during World War II, it is the 
aim of this study to understand what conditions brought about each change. It is also 
important to assess the effects of those same changes on the overall war effort in order to 
take make general observations about how the most significant changes of the war came 
into being. To that end, the effect of each change is categorized as either “major” or 
“minor.” A change is assessed as having a “major” effect if the results of the 
implementation of that change: (1) improve the strategic situation, (2) reverse the course 
of a major operation (such as Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of France) or 
campaign, or (3) enable a previously unobtainable objective or strategy. Otherwise, the 
change is assessed as “minor” (See Table 3). 
 Nature of Change 
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1 Before the addition of long-range escort fighters to the bombing effort 
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Similarly, the essence of each change is assessed. Changes in the form of 
modifications to existing equipment, concepts, tactics, etc. are considered “incremental.” 
Changes that create previously unemployed tactics, implement a wholly new military  
application for technology, or define a new means by which to wage war are all 
considered “transformational.” This includes the numerous instances where the U.S. 
military simply emulated another military. All other changes are labeled “incremental.” 
At the strategic level, a product champion existed in all but one change example (See 
Table 4). However, in four of the changes, civilian intervention was required in addition 
to the product champion to bring about change. In the cases of the OSS and long-range 
escort fighters, an outside civilian actually brought the idea to an individual on the inside, 
who championed it within the organization. For the OSS, President Roosevelt felt the 
need for better intelligence on which to base his decisions, and was the only person with 
enough authority to create an agency (the COI) to oversee the work of the four 
intelligence agencies of the time. However, William Donovan’s vision made the OSS into 
the high-impact organization it would become. Donovan also suggested the OSS report 
directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
During the long struggle for a suitable long-range escort fighter, the AAF was 
aware of the problems daylight precision bombing presented for bomber crews and of the 
magnitude of the losses occurring, but it took a civilian from outside the organization to 
offer a better solution. Had Assistant Secretary of War Lovett not written his 
memorandum recommending longer-range escort fighters as the solution to AAF Chief 
General Arnold, it is unlikely the institution would have been so quick to field the P-51. 
However, once the problem and solution were clearly defined by Lovett, General Arnold 
became the “champion” of the idea, ordering it into existence and subsequently 
accelerating deliveries of the P-51 to England. Both were necessary to bring about change 
in this area. 
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 Product Champion Civilian Intervention 
Daylight Precision Bombing X  
OSS X X 
Marine Raiders X X 
Long-Range Escort Fighters X X 
OSRD X X1 
Mounted Cavalry2    
Airborne Divisions X  
Air Commandos X  
1OSRD, though working primarily on military problems and employing numerous military 
personnel, was technically a civilian-run organization; it fell under the direction of the White 
House. 
2Horse-mounted cavalry was abandoned without a clear case of either condition 
Table 4.   World War II Strategic-Level Changes. 
 
The one instance of change where neither a product champion nor civilian 
intervention was present—mounted cavalry—was a clear case of abandonment. Mounted 
cavalry was demonstrated to be highly vulnerable on the armor-rich World War II 
battlefields by the Polish in 1939. The successful use of the horse by Russian Cossacks 
against German combined-arms forces on the Eastern Front was either not widely 
publicized at the time, came too late for the U.S. Army to reverse course, or appeared 
anomalous to those deciding the best ways to fight. Though there were debates and 
objections about the future of the cavalry, there was no intervention to preclude the shift 
to the motorized configuration. 
In sum, the existence of a product champion was slightly more important in 
bringing about a significant change that civilian intervention. However, four changes 
required the existence of both: the creation of the Marine Raiders, the OSS, the OSRD, 
and the long-range escort fighter. In the instances of the OSS and the OSRD, the 
existence of both a product champion and civilian intervention is explained by the fact 
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that both organizations were originally constructed outside the military chain of 
command. The OSRD actually reported to the White House, though later on a portion of 
it was transferred over to the U.S. Navy to carry out ASW. The OSS was the brainchild 
of a civilian product champion, who convinced the President of the merit of his ideas, 
who agreed to create it place it under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It appears 
there must be strong advocacy on both sides of the civil-military divide for successful 
organizational transfers to take place. 
The creation of the Marine Raiders, however, involved no such transfer. Instead, 
the product champions within the military establishment at first tried unsuccessfully to 
bring about change to their service and subsequently appealed to the president, who 
happened to be an acquaintance. This is clearly a unique set of circumstances, but 
indicates that if a military product champion can persuade the civilian leadership—
bypassing his chain of command—the chances are in his favor of getting the change 
implemented.   
The changes initiated at the operational level—where campaigns and major 
operations are managed—were few. This is no doubt due to the nature of the operational 
level of warfare itself; commanders at the operational level focus on the implementation 
of the strategy laid down for them by higher. In doing so, they rely on the capabilities of 
those units and commanders at the tactical level. When there is a need for a new or 
increased operational capability, it must be provided by improvement or changes at the 
tactical level. In World War II, these capabilities largely emerged as a result of the 
iterative nature of the conflict. Battle after battle, soldiers, sailors, and airmen assessed 
their effectiveness and made adjustments to reduce casualties the next time around. 
Therefore, the emergent hypothesis holds the greater explanatory power at the operational 
level. 
For example, the ASW doctrine in use (as opposed to that in publication) changed 
numerous times and eventually provided the operational commanders, Admiral King 
(CINCUSFLEET) and his counterpart in charge of Britain’s Coastal Command the 
necessary capability to defeat the U-boat threat to merchant shipping. No central 
individual or group sat down to re-write ASW doctrine during the Battle of the Atlantic. 
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Instead, multiple incremental improvement to tactics, equipment, and organization were 
put forth by ASWORG (later, the U.S. Navy’s Tenth Fleet) and implemented. Those that 
worked remained, and those that did not provided more data points for the analysts.  
The doctrine in use at the turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic (effectively 
May, 1943, when German Admiral Doenitz pulled his U-boats out of the North Atlantic 
convoy routes) was a hodgepodge mixture of escorts, medium bombers, RADAR, code-
breakers, centralized command, and other tactical improvements. It emerged over time. 
Following the termination of the war, lessons would be distilled and the applicable 
principles would be pulled out to form the basis for post-war ASW doctrine publications. 
In contrast, the organization created (also by a reluctant Admiral King) in 
response to the excessive shipping losses, the ASWORG, was the result of a member of 
his staff who had a clear vision about what such an organization could bring to bear on 
the problem. In this instance of change, the organization—albeit a lone “champion”—
understood the nature of the deficiency, and when he did not have a solution of his own, 
he proposed an emulation of those who did (the British).   
In each instance of doctrinal change (ASW, carriers, amphibious operations, and 
combined-arms), the emergent doctrine provided the operational commander an 
improved capability with which to plan for and wage major operations. Certainly, 
Operation Overlord could not have been planned or even seriously considered without the 
previous amphibious experiences and subsequent adjustments, such as those made 
following Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Iwo Jima, and the British defeat at Dieppe to name a 
few.  
 Planned Emergent 
Amphibious Operations Doctrine  X 
ASW Doctrine  X 
ASWORG X  
Carrier Doctrine  X 
Combined Arms Doctrine   X 
Table 5.   World War II Operational-Level Changes 
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The tactical level—the level at which it is decided how battles are fought—is by 
definition diffuse, and therefore a difficult level about which to make generalizations. 
Nevertheless, the changes examined in this case indicate that it is likely an external event, 
such as the experience of defeat or higher-than-expected casualties during an operation,  
is still required to enable change, even if a decentralized command structure exists. While 
decentralization alone may be sufficient, it was not in any of the changes examined here. 
It should also be evident that only three instances of tactical-level changes were part of 
this portion of the study.  
The lone change that did not require either decentralization or a previous failure 
was the implementation of airborne operations doctrine. This is not to say there were no 
failures during the course of airborne doctrine maturation; there most certainly were. The 
adoption of airborne operations and forces was due to the perception of German success, 
which suggests that perceived successes could also bring about change.  
Once it existed, American airborne doctrine was centrally managed by its 
proponents. Also, though never assessed as complete failures and never experiencing 
higher-than-anticipated casualties, early airborne operations did in fact experience 
numerous problems. The development of airborne doctrine also follows the trial-error-
correction pattern. During the Allied invasion of Sicily, airborne forces were the main 
effort. The results of that event helped shape subsequent airborne operations as tactical 
tools for use in support of operational capabilities. The airborne would remain a tactical 
tool until the end of the war. 
 
Decentralization 
Excessive Casualties or 
Mission Failure 
Hedgerow Combat Modifications X X1 
Airborne Doctrine   




Table 6.   World War II Tactical-Level Changes 
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The previous three discussions have corresponded to the level at which a change 
was initiated. With respect to technological changes, a level of warfare assignment would 
be inappropriate. It would be easy enough to aggregate these changes in with the 
strategic-level, as most technological advances must be vetted at least through the top 
echelon of the service into which they are to be implemented. However, that approach 
obscures the true origin of the change. As such, the technological changes are presented 
in a separate table (See Table 7.)  
The most prominent aspect of the technological changes included in this study is 
the fact that there was actually a stated need for the new technology in the theater of war. 
This does not mean that the changes implemented to fill the need were effective—not all 
of them were. In particular, the procurement of SONAR in anticipation of the U-boat 
threat proved to be ineffective. In addition, the Norden bombsight, though over ten years 
old at the time, was fielded on as many bombers as possible before any American 
bombers flew combat missions. Though its performance was poor, accurate assessment 
of bombing missions was extremely difficult; it was assumed the sight worked. 
Furthermore, its high security classification prevented pre-war testing, and the mystique 
of the sight overshadowed the reality of its poor performance. 
It is no coincidence, then, that those two technological changes were also the ones 
procured by the War and Navy Departments in response to German aggression in Europe, 
but before the U.S. officially entered the war or experienced combat of any sort. Another 
change that needs explanation is the emulation of Germany that led to the implementation 
of the parachute and glider. While the U.S. had previously experimented with the 
parachute, neither it nor the glider was considered militarily useful until the Germans 
showed the world what could be done with airborne forces starting in 1940. The War 
Department misunderstood the difficult nature of Germany’s invasion of Crete, and 
ordered the initiation of the airborne program solely based on its perception of a 
discrepancy between the capabilities of the German and American militaries. 
Nevertheless, the combat need hypothesis holds far greater explanatory power for 












Table 7.   World War II Technological Changes 
 
 
 Combat Need Procurement Inertia 
SONAR X X 
HF/DF Systems X  
S-Band RADAR X  
Norden Bombsight X X 
Parachute / Glider X  
Unmanned Bombers X  
Bazooka X1  
Specialized Landing Craft X  
1 Though no specific evidence was found of a formal, written requirement, it is inferred that 
the army laboratories knew of the infantry’s need for an organic anti-armor weapon 
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Study of the American experience in Vietnam allows an incisive look at how the 
U.S. military both changed itself and handled changes imposed by political constraints. 
Instances of change were numerous. The sheer length of the conflict certainly increased 
the number and types of changes undertaken by the military. Duration was not the only 
contributing factor; the nature of the enemy and his ability to frustrate the American 
military in battle also proved powerful catalysts for change.    
B. BACKGROUND 
As the Vietnam War has been described as essentially not one, but two wars, it 
therefore can be considered to have not one, but rather two beginnings. American  
involvement in South Vietnam began as an advisory mission during the 1950s. As 
Communism spread throughout Southeast Asia, numerous possible military actions were 
planned and debated to contain it.  
Many in the U.S. Government—President Kennedy chief among them—
recognized a fundamental difference in the nature of the struggle occurring in Indochina 
and that for which the American Military was structured at the time. Thus, President 
Kennedy’s directive to Secretary of Defense McNamara to increase the Department of 
Defense’s capability to wage counterinsurgency marks the beginning of the preparatory 
phase for what was seen as an increasingly likely military intervention in Southeast Asia. 
The initiation of the counterinsurgency effort—implemented primarily by small 
numbers of Special Forces—occurred in 1961, and therefore marks the beginning direct 
U.S. participation in the “irregular” war in Vietnam (Ives, 2007). The other, “bigger,” 
conventional war effectively began with the passing of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on 
August 7, 1964, which gave the president the authority to  
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take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any 
member or protocol stat of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 
requesting assistance in defense of its freedom...” until the President 
determines “…the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by 
international conditions created by action of the United Nations or 
otherwise… [unless] terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the 
Congress. (Porter, 1979) 
World War II was conducted, at least at its height, as a total war. Vietnam was a 
limited war in nearly every aspect. American resources, methods, popular support, and 
even purpose were limited, which in turn shaped the nature of changes that occurred 
(Komer, 1986). Self-imposed restrictions, such as the “defensive-only” rule governing 
attacks on Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) created the need to work 
around difficulties that should have been eliminated up front, and resulted in doctrine for 
countering threats locally instead of pre-emptively destroying them. 
C. SPECIFIC CHANGE EXAMPLES 
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Table 8.   Selected Changes for the Vietnam War 
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1. “Large Unit” Operations 
The decision to send large numbers of conventional troops was, in retrospect, the 
most important change of the war. Prior to 1965, the U.S. supported South Vietnamese 
forces engaged in counterinsurgency, but growing impatience within both the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the white house with what was perceived as South Vietnamese 
incompetence created an environment ready for change. The only question was what type 
of approach the U.S. should adopt (Krepinevich, 1986).  
Despite several studies and wargames indicating the truly difficult nature of 
jungle counterinsurgency and the poor results American combat troops could be expected 
to achieve, General Westmoreland, commander of U.S. Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam (USMACV) advocated privately to President Johnson that large numbers of 
combat troops were needed. Johnson, for his part had favored that type of an approach all 
along, and despite the studies and wargames, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with him. 
The only dissenting voice was that of the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam (and retired 
Army General Officer) Maxwell Taylor, who advocated expanding the U.S. Marines’ 
approach to “pacification” through spreading security to the population outward from the 
cities and hamlets. Ultimately, his dissension proved no match for the combined forces of 
President Johnson, General Westmoreland, and several members of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, who thought large-scale American military action was the means by which to rid 
South Vietnam of its communists (Krepinevich, 1986). 
2. The M16 rifle 
The rifle in service at the time of wide-scale American involvement in the 
Vietnam War was the M14. The Army did not necessarily believe that it needed a new 
rifle. In fact, it had just spent 15 years developing the M14. Yet in 1967, the U.S. Army 
decided to replace its entire inventory of M14 rifles with the M16. The process, on the 
surface, appears a deceptively simple case of “product champion” in that the Chief of 
Staff of the Army, General Harold K. Johnson, effectively made the decision following a 
study he initiated comparing the XM16E and the “Special Purpose Individual Weapon” 
(SPIW) prototypes. It was more complicated than that (McNaugher, 1984). 
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It was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who in 1962 asked why the Army 
was buying more M14s when a “better” weapon (the Armalite AR-15) was available. 
McNamara had been made aware of the AR-15 not only through Colt firearms 
representatives (who were partnered with Armalite), but also Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force, General Curtis LeMay, who was interested in equipping USAF security police 
with the new rifle. McNamara, for his part, had brought a somewhat iconoclastic method 
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), favoring analytical studies over tradition 
in many cases. He wanted the Army to take a hard look at the AR-15 (McNaugher, 
1984). 
From the Army’s perspective, the AR-15 represented much more than a change in 
rifle. It represented a wholesale shift away from the tradition of marksmanship on which 
it had built a long tradition. The AR-15 was light, fired a smaller caliber round, and 
looked more like a toy weapon than the M14 or its predecessor, the vaunted M1 Carbine. 
Army traditionalists wanted nothing to do with a “toy” rifle, but the Secretary of Defense 
pressed them until they agreed to purchase small quantities and equip select units with 
them (McNaugher, 1984). 
By late 1964, the Viet Cong had begun receiving substantial quantities of the AK-
47, the highly reliable Soviet-made automatic rifle. Its shorter range and lesser accuracy 
(compared to the M14) was unimportant in the jungle, where its superior volume of fire 
made General Westmoreland come to believe that the AK-47 gave the enemy a 
significant advantage. As it would happen, those units designated to receive the AR-15 
(now designated the M16) were some of the first to be sent to South Vietnam. Units like 
the 82nd Airborne, the 101st Airborne, and the Special Forces all carried the M16 into 
combat in 1965. Noting the weapon’s popularity among the units employing it, 
Westmoreland asked the Department of the Army to investigate the cost and logistics 
implications of delivering more M16s to Vietnam. At that point, he still considered the 
weapon as insufficiently combat-tested, and opposed full-scale integration until it was 
proved otherwise. The battle of Plei Me changed his mind. Following the conclusion of 
the battle, he was informed by one of the commanders involved that “Brave soldiers and  
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the M16 rifle brought this victory.” Within two months, Westmoreland had requested 
more than 293,000 M16 rifles with which to equip both American and Vietnamese forces 
(McNaugher, 1984).  
Though he initially wanted the Army to procure the new weapon three years 
earlier, McNamara did not want the M16 issued to South Vietnamese troops for fear it 
would end up in the hands of the Vietcong. He changed his position on the weapon, and 
instead backed the Department of the Army, which still officially opposed full-scale 
integration of the M16 and was completing its Small Arms Weapon System (SAWS) 
study. No doubt, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Johnson, felt the pressure to 
support the combatant commander and his troops. Johnson traveled to Aberdeen Proving 
Grounds, fired some of the SPIW prototypes, and unilaterally decided they were simply 
too complex; in December 1966, he wrote to Secretary McNamara that for the 
foreseeable future, the Army would be pursuing only the XM16E1 (the prototype M16) 
(McNaugher, 1984). The immediately available weapon—and by default, the theory of 
volume fire—won out over the M14 and the era of marksmanship.   
3. “Pacification” 
 “Pacification” became simply a different approach to the war. U.S. Army Chief 
of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson sponsored a study in 1967 titled “A Program for the 
Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam”—better known as PROVN—in 
an effort to repudiate the approach used by General William Westmoreland for the 
previous two years. The authors of the PROVN study contended that the security of the 
South Vietnamese population was the critical measure of success—not the “body count” 
in use at the time (Sorley, 1999). 
Clearly, the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 
General Westmoreland, could embrace neither the PROVN study results nor the concept 
of Pacification as a theory of victory without publicly admitting his own ideas and war 
strategy were fundamentally flawed (Sorley, 1999). Therefore, the concept of 
Pacification would be shelved until an amenable proponent would arrive in a position of 
authority to put it into practice.  
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Such a leader arrived in May 1967, when General Creighton Abrams took the 
position of Deputy Commander, USMACV. He was initially slated to succeed General 
Westmoreland just a few weeks following his arrival, but instead did not ascend to 
command for nearly a year thereafter. The reason for General Westmoreland’s retention 
was that following a visit to Vietnam during the same time period as General Abrams 
arrival, Secretary of Defense McNamara remarked to the press that instead of asking for 
yet more troops, as Westmoreland had recently done, he should more effectively use the 
forces he already had in theater (Sorley, 1999). A subsequent public reparation of 
feelings between the Johnson administration and the U.S. Army followed. In terms of the 
war, President Johnson could not remove Westmoreland without publicly acknowledging 
he had made a mistake in personally selecting him for the position in the first place. 
General Abrams took command of MACV in June 1968. Though the PROVN 
study had been written earlier by multiple staff personnel, and many flag-rank officers 
believed General Westmoreland’s (and therefore President Johnson’s) concept of how the 
war should be conducted was thoroughly defunct, it took the ascension of General 
Abrams to the position of commander to institute the changes required of the Pacification 
doctrine. 
4. U.S. Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Teams 
In March 1961, the Navy’s Strategic Plans Division proposed the formation of 
sea, air, land teams—to be known by the acronym SEAL—whose responsibilities would 
include the development of guerrilla/counter guerrilla capabilities. This proposal was 
made in response to the perception of President Kennedy’s advocacy for the U.S. Army’s 
Green Berets. Later, the proposition was expanded to add the duties of doctrinal and 
tactical development, and an advisory function. The units were to be manned from 
existing underwater demolition team (UDT) units (Bosiljevac, 1990). 
The creation of the SEALs represents an adaptation of an existing force to 
emulate the capability of another service. It is noteworthy that the core capabilities of the 
UDT men were retained, but their mission and operating domain expanded (from “sea” to 
“sea, air, and land”) to meet the needs of the anticipated operational environment. Their 
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initial deployment to South Vietnam was, like their Army and Air Force counterparts, 
advisory in nature until they found themselves fighting alongside their “advisees” against 
Viet Cong infiltrators. 
5. Brown-Water Doctrine 
Though numerous examples of littoral operations exist throughout its 
distinguished history, the doctrine of the U.S. Navy in 1962 focused primarily on deep or 
“blue water” operations. However, the Navy made a concerted effort to assess the 
possible roles and missions it could take on in support of the counterinsurgency mission. 
As was the case with the other services, the Navy found its personnel transitioning from 
advisory roles to active war planning to direct combat missions by 1965. The Navy had 
no up-to-date, published doctrinal guidance for the operations it began to undertake in 
support of USMACV—that mission had been traditionally filled by Marines, in particular 
the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and the Special Landing Force (SLF) (Marolda, 
1994). 
Naval planners also had the benefit of studying the French riverine force, the 
Dinaussaults, who used heavily armored and armed flotillas to conduct operations 
between 1946 and 1954, and their Vietnamese counterparts, the river assault groups 
(Fulton, 1973). Through the implementation of coastal and riverine patrols, and the 
combined operations with the army, the Navy had effectively figured out how to modify 
and use the small craft of the era to their utmost capabilities in support of both the 
counterinsurgency and large-scale conventional military operations. The Navy codified 
this doctrine in October 1968, when it published Naval Warfare Pamphlet (NWP) 21(A) 
Doctrine for Riverine Operations, effectively recording the best fundamentals it had 
learned regarding its two key missions in Vietnam: riverine assault operations and 
waterway interdiction and surveillance operations. A second volume—NWP 21(B)—was 
drafted in 1971, which emphasized patrol and barrier interdiction procedures (Marolda, 
1994).  
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6. Coastal Surveillance Force (Task Force 115) 
In response to a mounting belief that Viet Cong personnel, arms, and heavy 
equipment were being infiltrated into the South from the sea, the Commander in Chief, 
Pacific theater (CINCPAC) ordered a nine-man team to study the problem. The results of 
the study—named the Bucklew Report after its primary author, Captain Phillip H. 
Bucklew, a highly decorated UDT officer—were briefed in February, 1964. They 
included the assessment that though the movement of personnel was largely being 
accomplished overland, the Mekong and Bassac River complex provided a “natural and 
easily penetrable waterway” on which to transport heavy matériel. It further stated that 
seagoing “junks” and fishing boats could be used to infiltrate Viet Cong agents into the 
northern area of the Republic of Vietnam (Cutler, 1988).   
Though the Bucklew Report pointed out numerous actions that could be taken to 
stem the flow into the Republic of Vietnam from the waterways, no actions were taken at 
the time. The decision to take military action on the waterways was made following a 
chance observation by a U.S. Army UH-1 pilot in March 1965. He observed what 
appeared to be a moving tree-covered island in the middle of a waterway. Upon closer 
inspection, he determined the “island” to be a camouflaged ship, and radioed his 
observations to the appropriate Coastal Zone controller. Over the next several days, 
airstrikes and assaults were carried out, resulting in a capsized “island” and the discovery 
of millions of rounds of small arms ammunition and thousands of grenades, mortars, 
rifles, and machine guns. The next day, COMUSMACV requested theater naval 
personnel travel to his headquarters to plan a counter-infiltration effort (Cutler, 1988). 
The resulting organization, titled Task Force 115, and also known as the Coastal 
Surveillance Force, implemented most of the recommendations from the Bucklew Report 
and was initially comprised solely of existing “blue water” naval assets drawn from the 
existing Task Force 71 (Cutler, 1988). It would soon expand to include long-range patrol 
aircraft, destroyer escorts, patrol gunboats, minesweepers, “Swift” patrol boats, and Coast 
Guard cutters (Riverine warfare, 2006).  
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7. River Patrol Force (Task Force 116) 
In March 1966, another recommendation of the Bucklew Report came to fruition 
as Task Force 116 began patrolling the rivers environment of the Mekong Delta using 
primarily River Patrol Boats (PBR) and UH-1B “Seawolf” helicopters. The River Patrol 
Force effectively extended Task Force 115’s reach and degraded the Viet Cong’s ability 
to move matériel inland. In 1969, Task Force 116 began using OV-10 “Bronco” aircraft 
to increase its firepower and search capabilities (Dunnavent, 2003). 
8. Mobile River Force (Task Force 117)  
Though Task Forces 115 and 116 were effective at accomplishing their respective 
missions, General Westmoreland and the Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam 
(COMNAVFORV), Rear Admiral Kenneth L. Veth, desired a force that could not only 
use the rivers as a means to approach and harass the enemy, but also go ashore, encircle, 
and engage an enemy force. As they were heavily engaged in other regions, no U.S. 
Marine units were available to form the ground component of the new task force—Task 
Force 117 (Dunnavent, 2003). 
Instead, the U.S. Army’s Second Brigade, Ninth Infantry Division was slated to 
fill the task force’s need, and underwent specialized training in the upper San Francisco 
Bay before deploying to Vietnam in mid-1967. The task force would be the first joint 
Army-Navy unit of its kind, and also became known as the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) 
(Dunnavent, 2003; Riverine warfare, 2006). 
The MRF marked a significant change in concept from the previous task forces. 
Ground troops lived aboard 11 barracks ships which made up “Mobile Riverine Bases,”  
anchored in the Mekong River delta. The remainder of the 186-boat force was composed 
of numerous riverine assault craft and several types of converted vessels. Among them 
were artillery barges, armored troop carriers (ATCs), and “Monitors”—“Landing Craft, 
Mechanized” LCM-6 modified for the fire support mission with the addition of .30 
caliber, .50 caliber, and 20mm machine guns, grenade launchers, 81mm mortars, and 
either a 40mm or 105mm cannon (Riverine warfare, 2006).  Handfuls of LCM-6 landing 
craft were further modified to employ twin flamethrowers and became known as 
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“Zippos.” Zippos could effectively engage targets 160 meters away and, due to heavy 
foliage along the riverbanks, at times were the only weapons effective against enemy 
bunkers (Friedman, 1987).  
Eventually, TF 117 exhausted the limits of what could be achieved through 
riverine craft landings against a responsive Viet Cong. The MRF added an air mobility 
component to its operations, using helicopters to carry troops into battle, command and 
control, and also for resupply. During offensive operations, heli-borne infantry covered a 
main assault force’s flanks, and helicopter gunships were used for fire support (Fulton, 
1973). 
9. Task Force 194 
Combined, TF 115 sought to blockade the south from infiltration, TF 116 
hindered Viet Cong concealed movement on the inland waterways, and TF 117 sought 
out and engaged the enemy ashore. In the wake of the Tet offensive, the new 
COMUSMACV, General Creighton Abrams, urged the commander, NAVFORV, Vice 
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt to take more aggressive actions to stem the inflow of fighters 
from North Vietnam (Dunnavent, 2003). The enemy had changed his strategy and had 
begun to move in much smaller groups, using the smaller waterways and canals to avoid 
detection. NAVFORV had not adjusted it concept of operations, and it was apparent that 
infiltration from the north was still a major problem.  
Admiral Zumwalt toured the extent of the naval operations in the theater and 
came to the realization he could effectively blockade by water the majority of the 
Mekong Delta region, to include the area surrounding Saigon. His idea became known as 
the Southeast Asia, Lake, Ocean, River, Delta Strategy—SEALORDS. Initiated in 
October 1968, Zumwalt pulled together the existing riverine task forces: 115, 116, and 
117, and combined them into a single entity, Task Force 194 (Dunnavent, 2003).   
10. Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Special Landing Force (SLF) 
The force one would normally associate with amphibious operations—the U.S. 
Marines—was heavily employed during the early years of the conflict, but were initially 
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assigned to the mission of securing the airfields, villages, and cities in South Vietnam. 
The Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force was essentially a rotating force-in-being 
capable of crisis response missions throughout the theater. The deployment of Marines to 
Vietnam so over-tasked the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet that the SLF’s dedicated 
transportation, the Amphibious Ready Group was needed to transport the Third Marine 
Amphibious Brigade to the shores at Chu Lai in early 1965. As a result, the SLF was 
temporarily disbanded (Shulimson & Johnson, 1978).   
Though Marines had already conducted amphibious landings, many times they 
were to beaches that were already under friendly control located within another unit’s 
area of responsibility. As more shipping became available in the spring of 1965, planners 
at USMACV and headquarters, Seventh Fleet, proposed the concept of using amphibious 
raiding forces to interdict enemy infiltration and marshalling points along the coast to 
supplement the activities of the Coastal Surveillance Force (TF 115). On March 14, 1965, 
General Westmoreland and Admiral Johnson, COMNAVFORV, agreed to the staffs’ 
proposal to develop a concept of operations for a combined U.S. and South Vietnamese 
Marine amphibious force (Shulimson & Johnson, 1978). 
Soon thereafter, the SLF was reactivated and became the primary raiding force, 
though the air and ground units of which it was composed continued to rotate through the 
duty as they did previously. Eventually, the South Vietnamese Marines proved that 
complex amphibious operations were beyond their capabilities, and the concept was 
pared to include only American Marines. Additionally, numerous squabbles about the 
organization and command relationship of the SLF, ARG, task forces, and MACV 
hindered efforts to plan and execute missions. By June, General Westmoreland openly 
wondered what had happened to the amphibious raiding concept he had agreed to back in 
March (Shulimson & Johnson, 1978).  
In late September, the SLF executed its first raid via amphibious craft and 
helicopter landing. While the force secured its objective and demonstrated the new 
command relationships and existing doctrine to be reasonably sound, few enemy were 
found. A series of several more raids were executed in similar fashion under the 
operational label Dagger Thrust. Marine Corps official history assesses the Dagger Thrust 
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raids as having “failed to achieve their overall objective, the quick exploitation of 
intelligence and resulting contact with large enemy formations,” largely due to the 
excessive coordination required to plan and execute, which resulted many times in stale 
intelligence (Shulimson & Johnson, 1978).  
SLF raids continued throughout the next year, but would never achieve the results 
the originators of the idea had hoped for. Additionally, General Westmoreland grew 
increasingly uncomfortable with his inability to influence the SLF’s operations and 
eventually required Seventh Fleet to rearrange the command structure to assure him 
greater influence. Though the SLF continued to carry out operations into 1967, its results 
never proved worth the immense effort required to execute the raids, which resulted in 
significant numbers of American casualties. Eventually, it became a de facto reserve 
force, augmenting Army and other Marine operations as necessary. As one Marine 
colonel involved in sorting out the difficulties of the Navy-Marine-Army command 
relationship would later put it, SLF operations in Vietnam “by and large were sort of 
contrived. It was almost a concept looking for a home” (Shulimson, 1982). 
11. Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) 
The CIDG concept was developed to provide an organized defense capability for 
those villages that for various reasons could not be defended by the Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam (ARVN) and did not fall under the government of Vietnam’s control. Their 
ancillary missions included border security patrols, intelligence gathering, civic action 
programs, and psychological operations (Jervell, 1967). 
In practice, the CIDG was initially sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency. 
However, the acknowledged first “experiment” carried out in highland Montagnard 
village of Buon Enao occurred in 1961, and was executed by two Americans: one a 
Special Forces medic and the other an International Volunteer Services (IVS) official 
working out of the U.S. Embassy in an agricultural improvement capacity (Ives, 2007). 
The trust gained through improvement of the villagers’ health needs enabled further 
pledges on the part of the Montagnards to secure their own villages from incursion by the 
Viet Cong. Following the success at Buon Enao, more Special Forces were “loaned” to 
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the CIA and sent into the highlands. By 1963, the Special Forces ran several similar 
programs that together became the CIDG, and had effectively mobilized more than 
30,000 indigenous personnel who not only maintained their own village security but also 
patrolled the surrounding jungle and prevented the VC from moving into the region (Ives, 
2007).  
One of the keys to the initial success of the CIDG construct was the sheer 
uniqueness of it—particularly the logistical support provided by the agencies involved. 
The Special Forces were able to procure equipment for the irregular forces without 
having to request it through military supply. However, with growth came a fundamental 
shift in the focus of activities. In mid-1962, the Special Forces contingent operating in the 
highlands was large enough that it required the establishment of U.S. Army Special 
Forces (Provisional), Vietnam, commanded by a colonel.  
Growth also brought with it a shift in focus from internal village security to the 
development of strike forces, whose missions included patrolling the border with North 
Vietnam. It also meant the still relatively small SF contingent could not directly manage 
the large numbers of irregular forces created. Therefore, it became necessary to turn over 
the responsibility for individual villages to the South Vietnamese Special Forces for 
continued support. Unfortunately, the Montagnards and the South Vietnamese 
Government had long-standing animosities that prevented an effective working 
relationship (Kelly, 1973). The initial successes began to fade in 1964, and by the time 
large numbers of combat troops were committed in 1965, American strategic focus had 
shifted elsewhere. 
12. Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) 
The initial deployment of American Marines to South Vietnam in 1965 was 
intended to improve the security of Da Nang airbase and the immediate vicinity (History 
and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974). Their task soon expanded to include 
several cities and the numerous surrounding villages in the I Corps area of operations. As 
the Marines had a history of conducting “small wars,” the initial approach to security 
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taken by General Lewis Walt, Commander of Marine Forces under USMACV stressed 
building a relationship of trust with the local population.  
One of the company commanders, frustrated at being unable to sort enemy from 
neutral in a village for which his company was responsible, took the concept one step 
further. Instead of relying solely on increased patrols, he permanently deployed his 
Marines within the village to send the message to the residents that they would be secure. 
His motive was purely pragmatic—he simply did not have enough men to patrol enough 
to provide the level of security required to keep the VC from returning to that village 
(Krepinevich, 1986). In essence, the lack of resources to do otherwise forced a creative 
solution. 
Additionally, he took the local paramilitary “Popular Force” unit under his 
command, and soon the villagers were made increasingly responsible for their own 
security. Eventually, combined patrols were conducted around the clock—something he 
could never have accomplished using just his own company. Word of the success in 
driving out VC spread quickly, and soon the concept was replicated in numerous nearby 
villages (Krepinevich, 1986).  
CAPs would remain a local success, however. Though the program was 
formalized by the Marines and eventually secured over 800 villages, General 
Westmoreland and several of his staff viewed the entire endeavor as a waste of combat 
power—forces that could be out searching for and destroying the enemy in the jungles 
instead sat around the villages and “didn’t do anything” (Krepinevich, 1986). And though 
the program was successful in I Corps, there is no guarantee the idea would have been a 
“war winner” on its own (Kopets, 2002).  
13. Search-and-Destroy 
Following the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in the fall of 1964, MACV 
began requesting and receiving an ever-expanding number of forces and equipment. By 
early 1965, serious debate about how best to use American ground troops was occurring, 
and could be divided into three distinct schools of thought: (1) base security—protecting 
U.S. airbases from which airstrikes against the north were to be carried out; (2) an 
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enclave strategy, where American forces would be used to deny key geographical regions 
in the South, while ARVN forces conduct offensive operations against the VC; and (3) a 
search-and-destroy, by which American forces would “seize the initiative” (Komer, 
1986).   
General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, favored the third option, which was 
effectively sanctioned by President Johnson through National Security Action 
Memorandum 328, dated April 6, 1965 (Komer, 1986; Porter, 1979). Though 
unconventional and irregular operations were still part of the overall strategy, they took a 
back seat to what would become the massive effort to seek out and destroy VC “main 
units.”    
14. M113 Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACAV) 
Though much debate occurred about whether or not armored vehicles could 
perform any sort of role in the jungles of Vietnam, M113 armored personnel carriers 
(APCs) were transferred to the South Vietnamese to replace the old French armored 
vehicles in use at the time. The M113 was designed specifically to transport infantry to an 
engagement while affording protection from hostile fire. American doctrine dictated that 
upon reaching the objective, the infantrymen dismounted and attacked on foot. American 
advisors had great difficulty convincing their Vietnamese counterparts to dismount; 
instead, they preferred to attack the enemy using the vehicles’ mounted weapon and their 
individual weapons from the open hatches (Starry, 1979).  
During the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963, the Vietnamese Second Armored 
Cavalry Regiment attempted to reach an American helicopter that had crashed bringing in 
a reserve force of Vietnamese infantry soldiers. The Viet Cong had enough advance 
warning of the operation that they prepared defensive positions. During the course of the 
engagement, the main vulnerability of the M113 mounted-infantry assault tactic became 
apparent as fourteen soldiers operating the top-mounted (and largely exposed) .50 cal. 
machine guns were killed (Starry, 1979).  
The result was a Vietnamese initiative to add an armored shield around the 
gunner’s position, which they did using any available scrap metal that could be found. 
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They modified the first few M113s using soft steel from the hull of a sunken ship. When 
that was discovered to be penetrable, a larger search effort yielded armor plating from 
salvaged armored vehicles. Additionally, side-mounted machine guns were added to 
increase firepower available from atop and within the vehicle. All Vietnamese M113s 
were modified by 1964 (Dunstan, 1982; Starry, 1979).  
The relative effectiveness of mounted-infantry assaults over dismounted ones did 
not dissuade MACV advisors from attempting to persuade the Vietnamese armored 
cavalry troops to employ the M113 “correctly” by dismounting from it once in contact 
with the enemy. The idea never caught on. In fact, quite the opposite occurred: when the 
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was preparing for deployment to Vietnam in 1966, it 
elected to leave its tanks behind, replacing them with M113s that had been modified with 
additional hatch armor and two M60 machine guns—one per side. This modification—
known as the ACAV—eventually became the standard American M113 configuration in 
Vietnam (Dunstan, 1982).  
15. Vertical Envelopment (Airmobile) 
The first air assault of the Vietnam War took place in December 1961, when 
American helicopter crews—having just arrived in-country eleven days prior—airlifted 
approximately 1,000 Vietnamese paratroops to a suspected Viet Cong headquarters 
complex located ten miles west of Saigon. Resistance during the operation was reportedly 
“slight,” from the surprised enemy (Tolson, 1973).  
However, the concept of heli-borne, airmobile troops was not new at the time. 
The Army had been involved with the concept at some level or another since the Korean 
war (primarily in the medical evacuation, or “medevac” mission), but the limitations of 
the available helicopters to perform the mission of transporting troops on a large scale 
kept the Army from widescale adoption. The Marines had also previously demonstrated 
that small numbers of troops could be transported by helicopter to overcome the 
difficulties of the Korean terrain (Tolson, 1973). The ideas were there, but the technology 
still lagged far behind. 
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At the urging of Secretary of Defense McNamara, the U.S. Army initiated a 
review of its mobility requirements and capabilities shortly after he took office. 
McNamara took interest in the Army’s plan for its helicopters because he believed in the 
transformational nature of the helicopter—a view at least partly formed by inputs from 
the aviation industry—but also as a response to the lack of vision in the Army’s existing 
plan (Horwood, 2006). The subsequent study, known as the Howze Board (after its 
chairman, General Hamilton H. Howze, former Director of Army Aviation) included 
eight major exercises designed to represent several different geographic regions and 
tactical scenarios. More than one was designed to assess the effectiveness of the 
helicopter in support of counterinsurgent operations in remote, mountainous terrain. 
Additionally, a team of representatives from the board traveled to Vietnam in 
June 1962. The published report concluded that the helicopter would provide solutions to 
some of the tactical and logistical difficulties Vietnam presented, enjoying advantages in 
mobility and firepower over conventional units. It recommended the formation and 
deployment of three air assault divisions there, and ultimately the conversion of five of 
the army’s 16 divisions to air assault divisions (Horwood, 2006).  
One month after Howze made his recommendations, the Army deployed fifteen 
UH-1s to Vietnam along with a team to evaluate their effectiveness in counterinsurgency 
(Dougherty, 1999). The evaluation of these first helicopters focused primarily on their 
ability to support troop transport operations with armed escort. By 1964, there was one 
Army aviation company or Marine aviation squadron per Vietnamese Army Division 
(Tolson, 1973). The newly formed First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was one of the first 
units to be deployed to Vietnam during the troop buildup beginning in early 1965 (Allen, 
1993). 
By 1966, the airmobile concept extended far beyond the First Cavalry Division. 
Air cavalry squadrons supported nearly every division in-country. Even though there 
remained only one truly airmobile division, helicopter mobility flourished. As General 
Westmoreland noted: “During 1966, airmobile operations came of age. All maneuver 
battalions became skilled in the use of the helicopter for tactical transportation to achieve 
surprise and out-maneuver the enemy” (Tolson, 1973).  
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In something of an ironic twist, the Vietnam conflict not only “proved” the 
validity of the airmobile concept, but also severely limited the role it would play in the 
future of the U.S. Army. Instead of Howze’s vision of widespread helicopter mobility 
becoming the core concept around which the rest of the Army was built, Vietnam 
effectively confined the air assault concept to two specialized divisions. As company- 
and regiment-sized operations had been more common, the airmobile concept remained 
one of supporting existing combat arms rather than replacing them. Furthermore, the 
unconventional nature of the enemy in Vietnam stigmatized it as being useful primarily 
for “small wars” instead of large-scale conventional conflict as its visionaries had 
espoused (Allen, 1993). Had Vietnam turned out differently, the Army might have moved 
around the future battlefield more by aircraft than by ground vehicles.  
16. Helicopters 
The evolution of the American helicopter throughout the Vietnam War is closely 
tied to previously discussed airmobile concept. By the time of U.S. withdrawal, American 
and South Vietnamese forces had employed over a dozen different models of helicopters, 
many with several incremental (i.e., the UH-1C, D, H, etc.) variants  (Bowman, 1985). 
However, the airmobile concept came to be embodied by four primary machines in use 
by the U.S. Army: the UH-1, the AH-1, the Light Observation Helicopter, and the heavy 
lift CH-47 (Tolson, 1973).  
It is beyond the scope of this study to detail the numerous changes made to each 
of the helicopter types. Instead, it is more useful to look broadly at the Army’s attempt to 
modify its helicopter force mix in response to the operational environment and expanding 
mission set. As the CH-47 and UH-1 programs pre-dated Army involvement in Vietnam, 
the Army’s attempt to fill its requirement for a dedicated armed escort platform is the 
most instructive of the changes made to its helicopter fleet.  
The first American helicopters to operate in Vietnam were Army H-21s, troop 
carriers that had been in service since 1949 ("H-21/CH-21 Series," 2008). Eighty-two 
helicopters and approximately 400 crew and support personnel arrived in Saigon on 
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December 11, 1961, to provide South Vietnamese soldiers with battlefield mobility 
(Tolson, 1973). The H-21s soon proved highly vulnerable to small arms fire.  
As previously discussed, the Howze Board, following its visit to Vietnam in 1962, 
recommended the deployment of the UH-1 Iroquois (originally conceived as an airborne 
ambulance) to evaluate its performance as a troop carrier and armed escort. Soon 
thereafter, the need for defensive firepower drove the modification of the existing UH-1s 
and the requirement for a gunship variant. As the UH-1, or “Huey” gunships were heavier 
than their “slick” counterparts, they were also slower, and therefore of limited use in the 
escort role. In 1964, the Army began its search for a specialized helicopter gunship 
(Allen, 1993).  
Contributing to the Army’s difficulty in finding a suitable armed-escort helicopter 
was the United States Air Force. The USAF had fought the Army’s development of the 
airmobile concept from the time of its inception. Although Secretary of Defense 
McNamara had sided with the Army on the airmobile concept, a dedicated gunship—one 
capable of offensive missions—remained a highly contentious issue for the Air Force 
(Horwood, 2006). Compounding that issue was the fact the Army maintained a small 
number of heavily armed OV-1 “Mohawk” fixed-wing attack aircraft. These, too, were 
viewed as infringements upon Air Force roles and missions, and in order to get a new 
helicopter gunship, the Army had to get the Air Force to stop contesting it. In the end, the 
Army gave up the OV-1s, along with its light transport fixed-wing aircraft, the C-2, in 
order to gain the “turf” of the attack helicopter (Allen, 1993; Horwood, 2006).   
The AH-1 filled the dedicated gunship role by accident. The Army initially 
contracted with Lockheed for the AH-56 Cheyenne, known as the Advanced Aerial Fire 
Support System, but technical difficulties and cost overruns ultimately led to the 
cancellation of the project. Bell Helicopters had been developing, on its own, a follow-on 
gunship to the UH-1C. The design included the proven drivetrain of the UH-1 but added 
a radically altered, purpose-specific airframe. Armament, armor, speed, and combat loiter 
time were all significantly improved over the existing UH-1C gunships, and with no 
alternative on the near-term horizon, the Army bought it. After a year of development, 
the AH-1 was and fielded (Allen, 1993). 
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17. Airmobile Divisions: First Air Cavalry and 101st Air Cavalry Division 
On July 1, 1965 the Office of the Secretary of Defense approved the U.S. Army 
proposal to convert the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) and elements of the Second 
Infantry Division into an operational capability—the First Cavalry Division (Airmobile) 
(Tolson, 1973). During the previous two years, this force had taken the concept of 
airmobile infantry from the idea phase to an operational capability through rigorous test 
and evaluation. Nearly three years later, in June 1968, the Army created a second 
airmobile division by re-designating the 101st Airborne Division as the 101st Air Cavalry 
Division (Tolson, 1973). 
It was no coincidence the decision to create an airmobile cavalry force came at 
roughly the same time of rapidly expanding involvement in Vietnam. However, the 
decision to create a unique division centered on the helicopter and the concept of 
airmobile cavalry was another matter entirely. In order for the Army leadership to buy off 
on the idea of an entire division to be constructed around the relatively new (and 
perceived fragile) technology of the helicopter, an extensive test and evaluation program 
would have to be undertaken. The Army would need proof its current methods could be 
outdone, especially if it was going to mean purchasing hundreds of new helicopters and 
grant entry into the brotherhood of combat arms to its aviators. 
The stateside test effort of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) laid the 
groundwork. The tenacity of its leadership—primarily General Howze and the 
commander of the 11th, Brigadier General Harry W. O. Kinnard—were critical to the 
completion of such a wide-scale effort in just a three-month period (Horwood, 2006). 
General Kinnard’s establishment of an organization that took seriously all suggestions 
from its members in an effort to harvest the “best practices” from its exercises and tests 
enabled the airmobile concept to emerge as the superior option to established ground-
centric maneuver forces during head-to-head evaluations against elements of the 82nd 
Airborne Division. The Army leadership’s concurrence with General Howze’s conclusion 
that the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) should become immediately operational is a 
testament to the magnitude of their efforts. However, it is unlikely the Army or the 
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Secretary of Defense would have agreed to the airmobile division idea outside the context 
of wide-scale American involvement in Vietnam on the horizon in March 1965.  
18. Farm Gate 
Much as the Navy and Army had responded to President Kennedy’s desire to 
develop unconventional warfare capabilities for waging counterinsurgecy in Southeast 
Asia with SEALs and Special Forces, the Air Force stood up a special group of aviators, 
whose mission was to train and advise indigenous personnel for counterinsurgency 
operations. General Curtis LeMay ordered the establishment of the 4400 Combat Crew 
Training Squadron (CCTS), more commonly referred to as “Jungle Jim,” shortly before 
becoming Chief of Staff of the Air Force, in March, 1961. The squadron’s initial fleet of 
aircraft included modified versions of eight T-28 advanced trainers/attack aircraft, 16 C-
47 transports, and eight B-26 light bombers (Futrell & Blumenson, 1981) . 
It was only after the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the covert air interdiction 
of the Viet Cong’s inland supply routes in August 1961 that the mission for “Jungle Jim” 
became apparent. General LeMay recommended sending a detachment of the 4400 
CCTS, which had just been designated operational, to serve under the Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG) to devise and evaluate special warfare methods. The Air Force, 
and indeed the airmen themselves, viewed their mission as an experiement to devise 
counterinsurgency tactics and methods. President Kennedy, however, approved their 
deployment—code named Farm Gate—only in the capacity to advise and assist, and “not 
for combat at the present time” (Futrell & Blumenson, 1981). 
19. Herbicidal Warfare 
The decision to employ large quantities of defoliant in South Vietnam was not so 
much a single decision as it was a series of incremental steps, beginning with an idea and 
ending up with American aircrews spraying large swathes of jungle with a myriad of 
defoliants. The idea originated—albeit indirectly—with Walt W. Rostow, Deputy Special 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs following a trip to Vietnam in 
1961. Upon his return, he recommended the establishment of a unique organization to 
study solutions to the problems of counterinsurgency, to develop and evaluate 
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“techniques and gadgets” with which to wage this new kind of war (Buckingham, 1982). 
The use of defoliants was one of several project ideas generated by the organization, 
which was eventually formally established as the Combat Development and Test Center. 
Much debate occurred about the utility and appearance of herbicide use in 
Vietnam. The primary objections came from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman 
of the JCS, who were concerned about what could be perceived as American use of 
chemical weapons. Ultimately, President Kennedy agreed to a limited spray program, 
initially designed to clear foliage from along the sides of key roads and waterways to 
facilitate ARVN visibility of Viet Cong movements. He and his administration initially 
disapproved the other component of the defoliation test project: the deliberate targeting of 
South Vietnamese crops used by the Viet Cong as a food supply (Buckingham, 1982).  
In 1964, the test program increased in scope. A pattern developed: limited tests 
would yield favorable results, which would result in vociferous proponency on the part of 
South Vietnamese leadership. Inevitably, public revelations of the testing and use of 
herbicides occurred and brought public scrutiny. The scrutiny, in turn, generated another 
round of review and evaluation. More significantly, though was the granting of authority 
for executing both “clearance of key routes” and “food denial” missions to CINCPAC 
and the American Ambassador. Once that happened, the oversight and scrutiny were 
significantly reduced, even though “authorization by Washington” was to be obtained 
prior to engaging in such missions (Bundy, 1961). 
The organization primarily responsible for carrying out defoliant spray operations 
eventually came to be known by its operational code name: Ranch Hand. The initial 
cadre was formed by Tactical Air Command (TAC) from the handful of personnel 
attached to the Special Aerial Spray Flight (SASF) based out of Langley, Virginia, whose 
mission was the application of insecticide to U.S. Government facilities as required. The 
remainder of the unit was filled out by individuals who had volunteered for the 4400 
CCTS but were not selected (Cecil, 1986).  
Ranch Hand suffered initially from both the lack of a well-defined mission and 
being subject to multiple authorities. It remained an ad hoc organization from its 
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departure from the United States in 1961 until formally adopted as a Detachment 1, 315th 
Troop Carrier Group, and became an organization permanently assigned to Southeast 
Asia and reporting to PACAF (Buckingham, 1982). 
20. Advanced Tactical Support Base (ATSB) 
Following the limited success of the Coastal Surveillance Force (TF 115), the 
Navy looked for ways to continue improving the effects it was achieving against Viet 
Cong infiltration via waterway. With the implementation of Operation SEALORDS (TF 
194), American and Vietnamese naval forces raided Viet Cong-controlled inland 
waterways and surrounding shorelines. One significant limitation noted by Admiral 
Zumwalt, COMNAVFORV, was that several regions of heavy VC activity were far 
enough away from naval support facilities that the raiding craft had to travel long 
distances to get there, and spend relatively little time in the area before having to return to 
base for supplies. Naval presence in these remote regions was sparse enough that they 
remained firmly in Viet Cong control (Cutler, 1988).  
In order to increase his riverine fleet’s reach into Viet Cong sanctuaries, Admiral 
Zumwalt came up with the idea of the ATSB. His initial proposal—to build a riverside 
base—was deemed “foolishly risky” by Army leadership in the region. He then came up 
with the idea to build a base in the middle of a river: a floating structure composed of 
several barges joined together and located within the enemy strongholds. It allowed for 
patrol craft and raiding forces to stage from and return to a closer base, plus establish a 
permanent presence in a region previously controlled exclusively by the VC. This idea, 
too, was deemed “foolishly risky,” but he was able to convince General Abrams, 
COMUSMACV, of the merits of the plan (Cutler, 1988).   
The project proved extremely successful in forcing the Viet Cong to relocate. 
Several ATSBs were built, and each one improved on the concept. One ATSB built on 
the very southern tip of Vietnam could house 700 sailors and soldiers, and was defended 
by four 81mm mortars, six .50 cal. machine guns, ten M-60 machine guns, anti-mine 
nets, and electronic sensors placed on the adjacent river banks to warn of enemy soldiers 
(Cutler, 1988).   
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21. Riverine Craft 
The U.S. Navy had virtually no riverine craft in its inventory at the start of 
America’s military advisory effort in Vietnam. At the outset of Operation Market Time 
(TF 115), naval forces were operating “blue water” craft—destroyers, destroyer escorts, 
and minesweepers—in an effort to prevent infiltration into South Vietnam from the seas. 
The large size and draught of these craft severely limited the regions near the coast where 
they could effectively operate. For its part, the Vietnamese Navy possessed smaller 
riverine craft and conducted patrols inland. However, there were not enough close-in 
patrols in the shallower waters to affect VC inflitration (Cutler, 1988).  
The interim solution was for the Navy to employ 17 existing U.S. Coast Guard 
cutters, but it also undertook a search for a suitable riverine patrol craft it could procure 
quickly and cheaply. Fortunately, that search ended quickly when the Navy discovered a 
commercial solution in use in the Gulf of Mexico: a fifty-foot, all aluminum boat that 
transported offshore oil drilling crews back and forth to their rigs. It also had a three and 
one-half foot draught. The manufacturer, Stewart Seacraft, was based out of Louisiana, 
and despite the Navy’s requirement of over 50 modifications to the craft for combat use, 
delivered them 40 days after they were ordered. The modified version was called the 
Patrol Craft, Fast (PCF) or, informally, the “swift” boat (Cutler, 1988). 
Though quickly procured and highly suitable for the environment, the “swifts” 
were not without problems. The first variants were prone to corrosion. The deck had no 
space on which to place the cargo of a suspect vessel that was under search. And the crew 
living conditions were uncomfortable to the point that patrols had to be limited to 24 
hours—any longer required the crew be changed out while afloat (Friedman, 1987). 
Despite its shortcomings, the “swift” boat carried the brunt of the early riverine work. It 
was not replaced throughout the conflict, but rather augmented by newer variants. 
22. Laser-Guided Bombs (LGBs) 
America’s quest for a precision-guided air weapon dates back to World War I, but 
the requisite technology that would make them a reality was not available until the 1960s. 
Additionally, air-delivered weapons accuracy had improved, but not enough to bring 
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about a significant improvement in the effectiveness of “precision” aerial bombardment. 
At the time of America’s initial involvement in Vietnam, several improved weapons 
programs were in existence, but each had its limitations and flaws that prevented them 
from making major contributions to the employment of airpower (Gillespie, 2006).  
The Navy had developed an air-to-ground missile, called “Bullpup,” that was 
guided by the pilot after launch using radio signals. Similarly, the Air Force developed 
the “Walleye,” a glide bomb that used an on-board electro-optical camera system to allow 
the operator to guide it manually to the target. Finally, the “Shrike” anti-radiation missile 
had been developed during the 1950s to home in on radar-guided surface-to-air missile 
systems. However, none of these weapons made a significant difference during the early 
years of tactical airstrikes and strategic bombardment (Gillespie, 2006).  
It was not until the maturation of laser and semiconductor technologies provided 
the necessary components for the first suitable precision-guided weapons (Gillespie, 
2006). It is not surprising, however, that technological maturity was not the only force 
required to enable a change in the way air forces viewed weapons accuracy. During the 
early 1960s, the U.S. Air Force created a special “limited war” office at Wright-Patterson 
AFB, Ohio. Its charter was to acquire new technology that promised to provide 
immediate improvements to air combat in Vietnam.  
The former head of the “limited war” office, Colonel Joseph Davis, Jr., had 
become commander of all armament test activity located at Eglin Air Force Base, in 
Florida. He had been keenly interested in the problems of precision bombing as 
applicable to “limited war,” and in his new capacity as test commander, he witnessed a 
briefing that he thought had potential to make serious improvements in bombing 
accuracy. He arranged the appropriate audiences for the concept, which had been 
developed by Texas Instruments. Their idea was a laser-seeking device placed on the 
nose of an existing bomb, coupled to movable fins for steering. During the first briefing 
to a joint Air Force and Navy weapons procurement group, the concept was met with 
laughter; eventually the group would concede the concept was “feasible” (Gillespie, 
2006).  
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Though their idea was technically sound and efficient in that it was constructed 
around an existing bomb body, little progress was made initially. The idea of semi-active 
lasers being employed from USAF aircraft did not fit the existing mentality; the relative 
newness of laser technology did not help matters. Additionally, the Air Force had already 
committed to the concept of the electro-optically guided “Walleye” air-to-ground missile. 
Colonel Davis, however, would not let the concept die, at least within the Air Force. He 
was eventually successful in staging sort of a coup, gathering a group of key general 
officers for what was ostensibly a weapons program review; in fact it was an impromptu 
decision briefing, where they were all presented the results of the initial laser-guided 
bomb trials. At the end of the “review,” he presented them with a letter for signature 
indicating their support for the project. Upon submitting his letter to the Air Force 
leadership, the laser-guided bomb program began to gain traction (Gillespie, 2006).  
The initial combat trials of the laser-guided bomb concept showed marginal 
results and led to the redesign of several system sub-components. During a subsequent 
round of combat trials, which took place during July and August 1968, the F-4 squadron 
carrying out the evaluation experienced significantly improved results: the reduction in 
CEP (circular error probable, or roughly average miss distance) from 75 feet to just 20 
feet. One in four was a direct hit. The system was subsequently declared suitable for 
employment, but the bombing halt of March 1968 was still in effect. That meant there 
would be few missions “worthy” of precision-weapon expenditures—those targeting 
high-value, fixed structures—for the next four years (Gillespie, 2006). 
At the same time, a competing program, the AGM-65 “Maverick” air-to-ground 
missile (the “Walleye” successor) matured, but ultimately cost four-to-five times as much 
as the laser-guided bomb (by then known by its project name: “Paveway”). Because it 
was cheaper, “Paveway” was dropped more frequently, and therefore gained a reputation 
as being highly effective against smaller, mobile targets. By 1972, laser designator 
technology had matured to the point where it was installed on OV-10 forward air control 
(FAC) aircraft, carriage pods (for the F-4s), and AC-130 gunships, all of which could 
provide a terminal guidance point for an F-4 delivered Paveway bomb (Gillespie, 2006). 
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 Consequently, laser-guided weapons were used during Linebacker I and II to 
limit collateral damage and confine the campaign to military-only targets. For the first 
time in the history of aerial bombardment, aircraft (those employing “Paveway”) were 
capable of achieving direct hits with nearly every weapon (Gillespie, 2006). Finally, the 
potential for collateral damage minimization and sortie reduction were demonstrated in 
combat and the improvement in results was measurable. A further indicator of the 
weapon’s success was that shortly after the conclusion of the Linebacker bombing 
campaigns, it was procured by the U.S. Navy.  
23. Aerial Mining 
In May 1972, President Nixon finally ordered the emplacement of mines in 
Haiphong harbor to force the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table. Mining was 
accomplished solely by naval aircraft, and effectively prevented Soviet resupply of North 
Vietnamese war matériel by sea. Senior commanders and civilian leadership had debated 
about whether or not the mining of Haiphong harbor would ultimately bring about direct 
confrontation with the Soviet Union as early as 1967 (United States Department of 
Defense, 1971). The adoption of aerial mining by naval forces was not so much a change 
made by the service itself, but rather a change to a civilian-directed policy. 
24. Fixed-Wing Gunships 
In response to difficulty interdicting truck traffic on the Ho Chi Minh trail, the 
USAF developed a series of fixed-wing aircraft designed to engage targets at the center 
of a pylon turn. These aircraft were constructed from modified cargo aircraft that already 
existed in the Air Force’s inventory, starting with the C-47. The side-firing principle, 
however, required significant effort on the part of several key personnel (Ballard, 1982).  
Ultimately, it took several proofs of concept and the deployment to Southeast 
Asia to provide the overwhelming evidence (in the form of numbers of trucks killed at 
nighttime) necessary to convince the service to produce them in larger numbers and field 
them in squadrons. The side-firing fixed-wing gunship quickly proved to be the most 
efficient truck-killer flying over the Trail. A testament to this fact was the response by 
North Vietnam to begin moving radar-guided surface-to-air missiles farther south, which 
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effectively limited the gunship’s effective range and provided the Viet Cong with a bit of 
respite (Ballard, 1982). 
25. Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) Doctrine 
The Korean War saw marginal improvements in the Air Force’s capability to 
counter enemy air defenses. The recorded doctrine of the time, however, does not reflect 
it. Therefore, air operations begin over North Vietnam with the institutional belief carried 
over from previous conflicts that altitude alone would be sufficient to prevent 
engagements due to enemy air defenses. This only held true until the Soviets gave North 
Vietnamese the high-altitude, radar-guided SA-2 surface-to-air system.  
Later in the conflict, as the first American aircraft encountered SAMs and MiGs, 
political constraints came into being that required defensive-only targeting of SAMs due 
to the sensitive political nature of Soviet involvement. Consequently, “localized 
suppression” emerged as the doctrine of choice: “Wild Weasel” and “Iron Hand” 
missions became the primary means of suppression while strike packages completed 
missions. Those political restrictions were removed in 1971 and air planners shifted 
toward “campaign” SEAD, which consisted of the strategic bombing of missile facilities 
and storage sites to attrite enemy air defenses without having to first be engaged by them 
(Momyer, Lavalle, & Gaston, 2003).  
26. B-52 Conventional (Non-nuclear) Bombing 
In April 1964, General Westmoreland pleaded with the JCS to allow the use of B-
52s to bomb Viet Cong base camps within the confines of South Vietnam. Prior to the 
Vietnam Conflict, the B-52’s sole mission was to deliver nuclear weapons against 
strategic targets deep within denied territory. Nevertheless, the JCS conceded to General 
Westmoreland’s wishes and deployed the mainstay of America’s strategic nuclear force 
to Southeast Asia. The subsequent strikes began in June 1965, and were code-named Arc 
Light. The debate over the proper employment of the B-52 was kept alive by the fact that 
their initial employment was not even in the strategic bombing role; instead, Arc Light 
was a ground support campaign conducted mostly over South Vietnam, and designed to 
interdict enemy infiltration of troops and supplies from the north (Head, 2002). 
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As American involvement in Vietnam expanded in 1965, the USAF purchased 
what was known as the “Big Belly” or “High Density” modification to the B-52D model 
fleet to provide a significantly increased conventional munitions payload capability. The 
modification effectively increased the B-52’s bomb load capacity from 38,000 pounds to 
60,000 pounds. B-52 crews carried out Arc Light strikes until 1973, but it was not until 
they were incorporated into the Rolling Thunder campaign of 1972 that they performed 
the strategic bombing mission for which it was designed (Head, 2002). 
D. ANALYSIS 
As in the earlier analysis of World War II, the effect of each change is categorized 
as either “major” or “minor.” A change is assessed as having a “major” effect if the 
results of the implementation of that change: (1) improve the strategic situation, (2) 
positively reverse the course of a failing operation or campaign, or (3) enable a 
previously unobtainable objective, strategy, or tactic. Otherwise, the change is assessed 
as “minor” (see Table 9). 
Similarly, the essence of the change is assessed. Changes in the form of 
modifications to existing equipment, concepts, tactics, etc. are considered “incremental.” 
Changes that create previously unemployed tactics, implement a wholly new military  
application for technology, or define a new means by which to wage war are all 
considered “transformational.” This includes the instances where the U.S. military simply 








Table 9.   Level of Effects and Nature of Changes 
 
Of the changes made at the strategic level, neither the product champion nor 
civilian intervention provides a greater explanatory power. The seven changes are split 
evenly between the two (see Table 10). The primary reason for a split in the odd number 
of changes is the existence of both a product champion (General Westmoreland) and a 
willing civilian intervenor (President Johnson) in the proposed change from the 
advisory/counterinsurgency role to large numbers of American troops conducting search-
and-destroy missions. The overall assessment is that civilian intervention is the more 
powerful explanatory hypothesis, largely because even though the military leadership has 




 Nature of Change 
 Incremental Transformational 
Minor B-52 Conventional Bombing 
Search and Destroy 






 Vertical Envelopment 
 - Airmobile Divisions  
 - Helicopters 
Farm Gate 
Herbicidal Warfare 
TF 115 / 116 / 117  
- “Swift” boats 
- ATSB 
Brown-Water Naval Doctrine 



















 Product Champion Civilian Intervention 
B-52 Conventional Bombing X  
Search-and-Destroy X  
“Large Unit” Operations X X 
SEALs  X 
Herbicidal Warfare  X 
Aerial Mining  X 
Pacification X  
Table 10.   Vietnam War Strategic-Level Changes. 
 
The changes initiated at the operational level—where campaigns and major 
operations are managed—were more prevalent than in the World War II examples. This 
may be attributable to the unfortunate position in which more than one American 
commander found himself—that of ineffectiveness against an elusive enemy and 
experiencing uncertainty about how to achieve decisive results against him.  
Of the operational-level changes examined, seven out of eight are explained by 
the planned hypothesis; that is, the operational commander and his staff first made 
predictions about what they believed to be necessary capabilities for achieving their 
objectives (See Table 11). They set about developing those capabilities for operational 
employment. In essence, the organization worked as it should have. It is also noteworthy 
that five out of those six planned changes originated from within the Navy/Marine Corps 
team. Of the Navy changes, all were directly attributable to the willingness to expend 
time and effort to study the problem at the “ground level.” The recommendations made 
by Captain Bucklew were directly translated into the numbered task forces that defined 
the Navy’s “brown water” capability, even though nothing of the sort physically existed 
before entry into the conflict. Admiral Zumwalt’s TF 194 simply built on those concepts, 








Table 11.   Vietnam War Operational-Level Changes 
 
The lone emergent operational change was SEAD doctrine. The principles by 
which enemy air defenses were countered were fluid; though there may have been a 
centralized plan for dealing with North Vietnam’s air defense system, it was soon 
overcome by events. Pre-war doctrine would have had air defense systems targeted pre-
emptively, before launching air missions into hostile territory. However, with the 
introduction of the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system by North Vietnam came limits 
imposed upon airmen as to where and when they could target SAMs. These limitations 
were designed to keep the Soviet Union from directly entering the war on the North’s 
behalf. The unintended consequences were that American airmen many times had to wait 
to be engaged by a SAM for it to be targeted. This fact generated numerous changes to 
tactics and spawned the requirement for a whole host of electronic combat capabilities 
that did not exist at the time.Of   Of the tactical-level changes, the implementation of 
the CIDG and CAPs started at the very lowest level of warfare: the individual. In both 
cases, one individual carried out an idea in a single location and achieved positive results. 
The resulting success spread largely due to the absence of an alternatives. For the CIDG, 
the CIA and the SF did not initially command large numbers of troops with which to 
patrol and provide the population security they believed necessary to keep the VC from 
 Planned Emergent 
Marine ARG/SLF Raids X  
TF 115 X  
TF 116 X  
TF 117  X  
TF 194 X  
SEAD Doctrine  X 
Brown-Water Naval Doctrine X  
Vertical Envelopment  X  
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infiltrating the highland villages. For the Marines, the CAP concept sprung from a similar 
situation. Village security was identified as a key weapon against VC recruitment and 
infiltration in the South, and the only way a platoon leader was going to be able to 
guarantee sustained security to the village he was assigned was to move his platoon in 
full time.  
In both cases, the individual units had the authority to exercise the initiative that 
resulted in success. Therefore, decentralization provides the better explanatory power in 
Vietnam. It must be noted, though that decentralization was not the sole factor; the 
unsatisfactory initial results plus an absence of alternatives combined with the freedom to 




Excessive Casualties or 
Mission Failure 
CIDG X  
CAPs X  
Table 12.   Vietnam War Tactical-Level Changes 
 
The technological changes examined that occurred during the Vietnam War were 
overwhelmingly due to a specified combat need. Five out of the seven did not exist prior 
to the beginning of American involvement but were brought into existence by the 
interpretation of combat results and the generation of a requirement from the theater of 
war. One technology—the laser-guided bomb—was in fact desperately needed but not 
formally requested for two reasons: (1) the technology was largely unheard of, and (2) 
there existed a substitute (even though the substitutes were inferior, the performance of 
“Paveway” was not known to be better at the time). In that instance, it was not until a 
USAF colonel personally undertook the mission of getting the new technology into 
theater for a combat evaluation that it stood a chance. Positive combat results were the 
only reason the Paveway system was adopted. 
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On the surface, it appears reassuring that changes to the technology of a military 
at war were delivered expeditiously enough to be fielded in time. Part of the reason the 
procurement inertia hypothesis was proposed is because of the time required for a 
military-industrial complex to produce anything new—that is, not already somewhere in 
the production process. The fact only one instance of procurement inertia was observed 
in this study might also signal another explanation.  
Table 13.   Vietnam War Technological Changes 
 
One might speculate that the conflict’s lengthy duration actually accommodated 
the normal military acquisitions cycle. This is only partly true; a closer look at each 
instance where a system was procured because of a combat need, the acquisition timeline 
was accelerated in some manner. For example, the “Swift boat” was purchased as a 
modified civilian craft, which shaved years off what would have been a lengthy design-
and-development timeline. The AH-1 flew combat missions less than 18 months after it 
was evaluated due to the initiative of the Bell Helicopter company. The M113 ACAV 
modifications were copied directly from the South Vietnamese, whose bloody experience 
at Ap Bac provided the knowledge necessary to make positive change. 
 Combat Need Procurement Inertia 
M113 ACAV X  
M16  X 
“Swift” boat X  
AH-1 X  
ATSB X  
Fixed-Wing Gunships X  
Laser-Guided Bombs1  X 
1Though the need for precision-guided munitions existed, the stated operational requirement 
did not come from PACAF until the developmental team had pushed a combat test through 
and demonstrated limited success. 
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IV. OPERATIONS ENDURING FREEDOM AND IRAQI 
FREEDOM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter represents an attempt to assess ongoing combat operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. It covers the period of time from the attacks of September 11, 2001 
to the present, and describes the conditions and effects of significant changes as best as 
they can be understood at the end of 2008. The passage of time and the future writing of 
more definitive history will no doubt provide better insight into the dynamics of the 
changes presented herein.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The unique aspect of the American entry into Operation Enduring Freedom—as 
compared to the earlier cases presented—is the lack of lengthy and deliberate preparatory 
phase. Less than a month after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
American bombers were eliminating known terrorist training facilities in Afghanistan; 
special mission units and Special Forces soon followed. The nature of the attack against 
America demanded a quick, decisive response; those forces capable of responding 
quickly did so. 
These conditions stand in stark contrast to the entry into Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
During the summer of 2002, speculation about a possible invasion of Iraq created the 
need for detailed war planning, exercises, and rehearsals—all carried out while 
operations continued in Afghanistan. Indeed, one central lesson learned in Afghanistan 
shaped the plan for what would become Operation Iraqi Freedom: the belief in a lighter, 
faster, networked force supported heavily by airpower as the means by which to achieve 
a quick, relatively low-casualty victory.  
In the wake of conventional operations in 2003, the U.S. found itself still facing 
an elusive Taliban/Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and an increasingly violent insurgency in 
Iraq. American commaders—much like in Vietnam—found themselves waging a 
fundamentally irregular conflict for which they were largely unprepared. Numerous 
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changes were made in an effort to improve the ability to find, fix, and finish enemy 
combatants. Few changes had far-reaching effects against either insurgency. A 
representative sample of them are presented here (See Table 14). 
C. SAMPLE CHANGES 
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Changes initiated during Operation Iraqi Freedom are presented in bold. 
Table 14.   Selected Changes for OEF and OIF 
 
1. Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) 
The JIEDDO was formally established on February 14, 2006 by DoD Directive 
2000.19E, signed by Acting Secretary of Defense Gordon England, with the stated 
mission to “…focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in 
support of Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to 
defeat improvised explosive devices as weapons of strategic influence (JIEDDO annual 
report, 2008). JIEDDO is the second evolutionary step of what was initially a unilateral 
Army effort to stem mounting IED-related casualties.  
In October 2003, General John Abizaid, Commander of U.S. Central Command, 
wrote a memo to Secretary Rumsfeld and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
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General Meyers, requesting assistance with what he called the “number one killer” of 
American troops. In his memo, he proposed an effort similar to the “Manhattan Project” 
which had pooled leading civilian scientists, industry experts, and military personnel 
together in a single organization that produced the first atomic weapons during World 
War II. What resulted was a 12-person task force set up within the Department of the 
Army, and soon thereafter, bureaucratic stagnation (Atkinson, 2007; R. F. Ellis, Rogers, 
& Cochran, 2007). 
In July 2004, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, frustrated by the lack 
of progress and steadily increasing IED attacks on American troops, authorized the 
establishment of an Army-led joint task force, which brought the remaining services into 
the effort (R. F. Ellis et al., 2007). The following month, the newly redesignated joint 
integrated process team (JIPT) carried out experiments in Iraq in accordance with 
General Abizaid’s desire to operationally test any equipment that had “a better than even 
chance of success” (Atkinson, 2007). 
By May 2005, IED attacks on American forces numbered more than 1,000 per 
month. In June, Assistant Secretary of Defense England elevated the organization’s status 
once more by moving it out from underneath the Department of the Army making it a 
“joint” organization: the Joint IED Defeat Task Force (JIEDD-TF). In addition, Secretary 
Rumsfeld appointed a retired four-star general to lead it. The JIEDD-TF at that point 
controlled more than $1 Billion in resources dedicated for “training and technology 
priorities” ("Rumsfeld Appoints Retired Four-Star," 2005). 
As the JIEDD-TF and CENTCOM implemented new technologies and tactics to 
defeat IEDs, insurgent IED cells adapted by switching detonator mechanisms and shifting 
kill mechanisms to highly-lethal explosively-formed penetrator (EFP) designs—
speculated to have been provided by Iranian operatives. With each advance against the 
IED devices came a counter (Atkinson, 2007). By the time JIEDDO-TF was made a 
permanent organization and re-designated for the final time as JIEDDO, its scope of 
operations had expanded to focus not only on technological solutions for defeating IEDs, 
but also to attack the IED network and provide training to the affected coalition force; its 
budget swelled to $3.63 Billion. By 2007, JIEDDO was authorized 418 positions, 
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encompassed several subordinate organizations, was responsible for developing the 
DoD’s long-range counter-IED strategy, and controlled resources in excess of $4.39 
Billion (JIEDDO annual report, 2008).  
2. HMMWV Armor Modifications 
Soon after the declaration of the end of major combat operations, U.S. forces 
came increasingly under attack by what was perceived at the time to be uncoordinated 
pockets of regime “dead-enders” (Liu, Barry, & Hirsh, 2004). As most of the armored 
forces had been redeployed home to reduce the appearance of an American occupation 
force, those troops who did remain relied heavily on the standard HMMWV (“Humvee”) 
for transportation—many of which had soft-sided canvas doors and tops. In August, 
2003, the Army twice upped its stated requirement for armored HMMWVs in Iraq; in 
October it began the transfer of armored HMMWVs from bases around the world to units 
operating in Iraq. In November, the Army began attempting to procure more add-on 
armor kits for its HMMWV in order to fill what was expected to be a shortfall of suitably 
protected vehicles by tripling the number of suppliers from which it bought the kits 
(Squitieri, 2005).  
The Army realized in June 2003 it did not have enough armored HMMWVs in 
Iraq to protect troops from the increasing attacks by made by insurgents (Squitieri, 2005). 
The lack of armor combined with the daily enemy contact drove individual units to 
improvise their own armor configurations. This resulted in marginal increases in 
protection, but also to other problems with the HMMWVs, as the extra weight of the 
armor took its toll on transmissions, engines, and suspensions. Additionally, the 
improvised armor created a tendency for the vehicles to roll during quick turns (Liu et al., 
2004). One Alabama National Guard unit even had local machine shops and volunteers 
install donated armor plating before deploying to Iraq (Zoroya, 2004). Though armored 
HMMWVs protected troops from roadside IEDs and side-attacks, insurgent forces soon 
discovered and exploited the inherent vulnerabilities of its underside.  
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3. Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle 
In December 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, concerned with 
the increasing casualties caused by roadside bombs, directed the JCS to explore options 
for getting better armor to the troops. The problem was clearly one that demanded 
urgency. One of the options studied by Joint Staff analysts was a vehicle produced in 
Namibia called the “Wer’Wolf”—a type of armored, “V”-hulled vehicle known as 
“mine-resistant ambush-protected” (MRAP) that had been in production for over 20 years 
(Eisler, Morrison, & Vanden Brook, 2007). However, as the problem was viewed as 
requiring an immediate solution and the consensus was that the U.S. would not be 
involved in combat in Iraq for much longer. The chosen solution was to add armor to 
unarmored HMWWVs and purchase more armored HMWWV variants ("A New Age in 
Troop Protection," 2007). 
Though IED casualties began to increase as the insurgency grew in strength by 
the end of 2003, the first formal, documented request for 1,169 MRAP was not submitted 
until February 2005. It was this request that was “shelved” by the Marine Corps, as the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Michael Hagee determined that the armored 
HMWWV was the best solution to the need for armor ("A New Age in Troop 
Protection," 2007). 
Though American forces did not employ the MRAP in large numbers, the Marine 
Corps used it as a means of transportation for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. 
It was at a base in Fallujah, Iraq that Marines began to question why the patrols coming 
under daily IED and ambush attack in Anbar Province couldn’t get such vehicles (Eisler 
et al., 2007). Mounting casualties only served to increase the perceived disparity. The 
Marine Corps leadership still believed the modified HMWWV was the best solution and 
had decided the Marines would hold out for a future program, the Joint Light Tactical 
Vehicle (JLTV) (Eisler et al., 2007).   
While the armored HMMWV solution provided an increased measure of 
protection, it also drove the insurgents to adapt their tactics. Between January and 
September, 2005 there had been only 10 attacks in Anbar Province in which an IED was 
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emplaced on a roadway and detonated as a convoy passed over it. In January 2006, there 
were 16, and there would be 120 for the entire year ("A New Age in Troop Protection," 
2007). The enemy had witnessed the effectiveness of the side armor and discovered the 
vulnerability of the HMMWV to attack from below. 
Though the troops experiencing such attacks were painfully aware of the shift in 
tactics and the serious problem buried IEDs posed, it is not clear the decision-makers at 
the Marine Corps, Army, or Joint Staffs understood the ramifications. More importantly, 
the staff sections assigned to study and make recommendations concerning the Urgent 
Universal Needs Statement (UUNS) submitted by the Marines in February 2005 
questioned its urgency and recommended it be filled by existing and future programs—
already budgeted and approved—instead of the unique, commercially available vehicle 
requested (Gayl, 2008). The request disappeared within the bureaucracy for several 
months. 
Fifteen months later, Marine leadership in Iraq sent a second request, only this 
time they sent it through the U.S. Central Command chain, which effectively bypassed 
the Marine Corps headquarters staff and ensured the requirement would be reviewed by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This action resulted in the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
receiving a comprehensive briefing concerning the delay of the previous request and a 
detailed accounting of the IED-related casualties experienced by the Marines in Anbar. 
The Commandant immediately agreed to support the requirement, as would the Secretary 
of Defense, the Joint Staff, and eventually the Army (Gayl, 2008). Secretary of Defense 
Gates made fielding the MRAP his number one priority and publicly declared that 
delivery speed—not price—was the key criterion (Axe, 2007). MRAPs began showing 
up in-theater in significant quantities in 2007 ("A New Age in Troop Protection," 2007). 
By one estimate, the delay in fielding the MRAP cost an extra 762 American lives (Gayl, 
2008). 
4. Human Terrain System 
The deficiencies in American knowledge of local Iraqi culture became a 
significant disadvantage once the insurgency began to grow in 2003. Following 
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complaints by officers serving in Iraq, the Department of Defense contacted a Yale-
educated cultural anthropologist, Montgomery McFate, who was working for the Navy at 
the time and had been advocating the use of social science to improve military operations 
and strategy (Kipp, Grau, Prinslow, & Smith, 2006). Her first project in response to the 
complaints of lack of local cultural knowledge was to develop a detailed database of 
information on the local population for use by the officers. The following year, a retired 
special operations colonel joined the program and advocated embedding social scientists 
with combat units (Rohde, 2007). 
The concept became increasingly important as the U.S. military focused on 
improving its counterinsurgency efforts. The first Human Terrain Team was fielded in 
Afghanistan in 2007. The Human Terrain System concept centers around the individual 
team, which is composed of a civilian social scientist (an anthropologist), a military team 
chief, an area specialist, and research manager ("Human Terrain Team," 2008). The rest 
of the “system” consists of a reachback capability to harness a network of subject matter 
experts from the DoD, interagency, and academia, and is managed through the U.S. 
Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, a part of Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC) (Kipp et al., 2006).  
Units in Iraq and Afghanistan that have employed the teams have given them high 
marks for utility; brigade commanders use their inputs in parallel with intelligence to 
make decisions about how to operate and employ within the neighborhoods in their 
sector. The only major objections noted in the literature have come from academics, who 
largely express the belief that the social sciences will be corrupted if wielded under 
government control (Jayson, 2007). A good measure of how the Army viewed the teams 
following their initial deployments was its commitment to expand from six teams to 26, 
and its budgeting of $40 million to fund them for 2008 (Mulrine, 2007).  
5. Counter-Scud Task Force 
During the preparation for what would become Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
President Bush emphasized to the CENTCOM commander, General Franks, the 
importance of keeping Israel out of the war (Woodward, 2002). This meant preventing 
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the launch of Iraq’s surface-to-surface missiles (more commonly referred to as “Scuds,” 
after the SCUD-B variant) at Israeli cities, as Saddam Hussein had done during Operation 
Desert Storm in 1991. In all, 86 Scud launches took place during that conflict. Of the 
hundreds of Scud launchers claimed to have been destroyed by aircrews, post-conflict 
assessment showed the real number destroyed to be precisely zero (Trowbridge, 2003). 
Therefore, in operational terms, this meant CENTCOM had to organize and field a force 
capable of “finding, fixing, and finishing” the mobile Scud transporter, erector, launchers 
(TELs) before any could fire their missiles.  
The responsibility ultimately fell to the air component, whose commander, 
Lieutenant General Moseley, who as the Combined Forces Air Component Commander 
(CFACC) put together a combined team of air- and space-based ISR, strike platforms, 
and command and control, supported by special operations forces on the ground (Robbins 
& Leggett, 2003). The task force conducted several live rehearsals (Jumper, 2004), 
coordinated and executed by members of the Air Combat Command weapons and tactics 
division. The rehearsals used the Nevada desert to simulate the desolate terrain of western 
Iraq—assessed to be the only feasible launch location due to the limitations of the Scud 
missile’s range and commensurate with the coalition’s experience during Operation 
Desert Storm. 
The primary goal of the rehearsals was to exercise the coordination and approval 
process that would ultimately enable a strike asset to destroy a Scud TEL within minutes 
of finding it. Over the course of four iterations, a set of procedures evolved that formed 
the basis of the counter-Scud effort during the first few weeks of the war. During 
execution, no Scuds were launched from Western Iraq; missiles were fired from the 
southern portion of the country, but they were directed towards Kuwait. Once the 
CFACC determined the Scud threat to have been negated, the counter-Scud task force 
dissolved. Several of the fighter squadrons redeployed to their respective home countries, 
while the special operations forces assumed new mission taskings in the post-invasion 
phase of the conflict.   
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6. Non-Traditional Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(NTISR) 
The lack of fixed targets and pre-planned strikes in Afghanistan created the need 
for an “on-call” approach to allocating airpower. Tactical air needed to be available 
around the clock, ready to respond to a team on the ground anywhere inside the country. 
This also meant that whenever that air capability was not needed, the aircrew orbited 
without tasking.  
The implementation of the targeting pod by numerous fighter and attack aircraft 
gave the aircrew an effective tool—more so thann the naked eye—with which to search 
the terrain below. However, this capability was not formally harnessed into the ISR 
collection management system. That is, until Brigadier General Rew, former director of 
operations for CENTAF and Ninth Air Force (a former F-16 wing commander), 
substituted an advanced targeting pod-equipped F-16 for a U-2 on a mission to collect 
imagery over southern Iraq in 2002. He made the substitution because the F-16 could fly 
below the weather and was more responsive to re-tasking than the pre-scheduled U-2 
mission (Tirpak, 2006).  
Non-traditional ISR became a standard mission for targeting pod-equipped jet 
during Iraqi Freedom. The concept proved useful enough that it was expanded by using 
microwave transmitters, mounted inside the targeting pods to transmit the imagery the 
crew saw while airborne to a specially equipped receiver on the ground, called remote 
off-board video enhanced receiver (ROVER). During CAS, ROVER effectively enabled 
the supported controller on the ground to view the immediate battlespace from the 
overhead perspective. It also provided a new means by which to ensure an aircraft 
releasing weapons was doing so at the correct aim point. While at first there was 
resistance to becoming “manned Predators,” the practice was adopted to the extent the 
equipment was available largely because the CFACC viewed it as “the right thing to do” 
(Tirpak, 2006). 
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7. Time-Sensitive Targeting 
The USAF’s effort to engage dynamic, mobile targets has its modern origins in 
the failure to interdict Scud missile launchers during Operation Desert Storm (Fyfe, 
2005). Scuds were initially determined to be of little tactical threat; however, the strategic 
significance of the launches became readily apparent to the coalition when missiles began 
to rain down on Israeli cities, threatening to expand the war outside the borders of Iraq 
and Kuwait. Initial attempts to send aircraft to areas of Iraq where Scud launches had 
been either visually observed or detected by reconnaissance satellites resulted in a time-
consuming, centralized effort to reprioritize airborne or ground alert assets, which often 
arrived at the reported location only to find empty desert.    
The experience of Operation Allied Force (OAF) was only marginally better; at 
the outset, there still existed no formal process by which to prioritize targets and re-task 
aircraft while airborne. The closest substitute was the development of the concept of “flex 
targeting,” where certain aircraft were designated as capable of switching targets once 
airborne and others were placed on strip alert in the event of a high-value or emerging 
target. These initiatives were a step in the right direction, but did not satisfactorily 
address the issue of targeting priority in real time. Some of the “flex” missions took 
aircraft away from striking intended targets that were ultimately of higher priority than 
the targets to which they were “flexed.” Following the termination of OAF, Air Force 
leadership made a concerted effort to develop the doctrine and technical capability to 
prosecute time sensitive targets smoothly (Fyfe, 2005).  
Though numerous advances had been made towards implementing a workable, 
efficient TST process—largely through improvement of the operations and training of the 
personnel manning the Air Operations Center (AOC)—most of the guidance and doctrine 
documents were still in draft form by the time the U.S. entered into combat operations in 
October 2001. Therefore, CENTCOM and CENTAF had conflicting, redundant TST 
processes that hampered early efforts to engage emerging targets. Differences in the 
methodologies by which each staff’s targeteers estimated the desired impact points and 
potential collateral damage created a situation where each staff checked the other’s work, 
thereby lengthening the execution timeline. Furthermore, CENTAF emphasized the time 
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aspect, and attempted to execute as quickly as possible, whereas CENTCOM emphasized 
the sensitivity aspect, more heavily weighting potential collateral damage and other 
factors, which in turn dictated the timeline of a strike (Fyfe, 2005). 
Most significant was the centralized authority required to conduct TST strikes 
early in OEF. The senior levels of CENTAF and CENTCOM were the approval 
authorities for TST strikes, except for cases of select leadership targets, when the 
Secretary of Defense himself gave the approval. An Air Combat Command-sponsored 
analysis of TST conducted during the ongoing campaign noted the previously mentioned 
difficulties, plus the observation that in many instances, the TST process itself largely 
depended on the personalities of the individuals interacting between CENTAF and 
CENTCOM at the time. The study provided four key recommendations for improvement, 
all of which were aimed at standardizing definitions and processes. After five months of 
operations in OEF, a truly joint TST process emerged (Fyfe, 2005).  
The concepts developed in OEF provided the fundamental platform on which the 
counter-theater ballistic missile (CTBM) task force would develop their decentralized 
rules of engagement and procedures for rapidly engaging emerging targets, but without 
sacrificing collateral damage concerns. In turn, the counter-Scud team put into place the 
procedures in OIF that—once the Scud missile threat diminished—enabled a truly fine-
tuned TST process to be used against non-TBM emerging targets. In fact, the process 
became so streamlined and effective that virtually any emerging target—not just those of 
a “time sensitive” nature—was handled by the TST cell (standard CAOC procedures 
would have normally had the offensive duty staff handle such changes) (Fyfe, 2005). 
8. Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
Top American leadership had a problem identifying the increasing violence 
against U.S. troops in the wake of the successful overthrow of the Hussein regime as 
indications of an insurgency. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld actually refused to use the 
word “insurgency,” and instead attributed the resistance to regime “deadenders” (Liu et 
al., 2004). However obstinate national leadership might have been, commanders in the 
field saw the true nature of the situation: that former Ba’athists and newly unemployed 
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Iraqi military personnel had banded together to form a loosely orchestrated, primarily 
local opposition to the occupying American forces. Additionally, foreign fighters came 
from neighboring countries to aid the effort. By April 2004, senior military officials in 
Iraq acknowledged they were indeed fighting an insurgency, but were spending enormous 
efforts to combat the mounting casualties resulting from the ever-increasing IED attacks 
(Pirnie & O'Connell, 2008).   
Though a few individual commanders at the tactical level made adjustments to 
how they conducted operations, such as Colonel H. R. McMaster’s deliberate 
counterinsurgency operation within the city of Tal Afar in 2005 (Mansoor, 2008), an 
effective, coordinated strategy did not exist until 2007. Though American casualties 
steadily increased and public support for the Iraq war waned through 2006, the mid-term 
congressional elections provided the most urgent impetus for a change in strategy. The 
day prior to the elections, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted the need for a “…major 
adjustment…” and that “…what U.S. forces are doing in Iraq is not working well enough 
or fast enough.” The next day, following the Democratic gains in the house and senate, 
the President accepted Secretary Rumsfeld’s resignation (Pirnie & O'Connell, 2008). 
In early 2007, President Bush had three separate, recently completed studies from 
which he could choose a new course of action. General Pace, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had initiated an internal review at the end of 2006 that assessed strategic 
options. Similarly, the president had previously ordered his National Security Advisor, 
Stephen Hadley, to conduct a similar internal review. Finally, the Iraq Study Group’s 
assessment of the declining situation in Iraq had recently been completed. In the end, he 
opted to undertake what was quickly but confusingly referred to as the “surge” (even 
though it involved much more than the simple increase in numbers) strategy of increasing 
troop levels by 30,000 (Pirnie & O'Connell, 2008). 
During 2006, the individual who would be selected to implement the “surge” 
forces—Lieutenant General David Petraeus—had overseen the authoring of the Army’s 
and Marines’ first counterinsurgency doctrinal publication in the last 20 years (Milburn, 
2007). During his confirmation testimony as the newly appointed commander of Multi-
National Force-Iraq, General Petraeus outlined how he would employ the additional 
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troops, discussing the “…primacy of population security…” and the “…need to achieve 
sufficient security to provide the space and time for the Iraqi government…to move 
forward.” More importantly, he stated that simply having more troops in the country 
would not be nearly as important as “…what they will do and how they will do it...” 
(Transcript, 2007). 
Once in command, General Petraeus set about implementing the principles about 
which he testified. His strategy was a combination of refocusing operations on achieving 
population security by establishing a more permanent presence “outside the wire,” and 
increasing efforts to get local populations to increasingly take responsibility for their own 
security. This meant extending contracts to tribes that would volunteer to fight al-Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI) as well as overseeing further increases in the Iraqi military (Mansoor, 
2008). Though claims of success are premature, sectarian violence and attacks on 
coalition soldiers plummeted as a result. Judgment about future outcomes aside, 
Multinational Force, Iraq (MNF-I) fully implemented a unified counterinsurgency 
doctrine. 
9. Bomber CAS 
The first use of a B-52 in the close air support (CAS) role took place during the 
Vietnam War. The U.S. Marines had worked out the procedures and equipment necessary 
to make effective use of the bomber’s persistence and heavy ordnance load in close 
proximity to friendly forces by employing a mobile ground-based radar-direction system 
call Combat Skyspot. Most notably, B-52 crews flew 2,500 sorties in support of the 
besieged marines at Khe Sanh (Theisen, 2003). Despite that experience and the 
subsequent execution of CAS missions during Operation Desert Storm, the USAF 
bomber community did not routinely train for or emphasize CAS, except for a “few 
hours” of academics during mission qualification training (Theisen, 2003).  
The B-52, B-1, and B-2 crews preparing for war in Afghanistan following the 
September 11 attacks planned to conduct strike missions against fixed Taliban and Al 
Qaeda assets: training camps, radar sites, air defense positions, aircraft, and command 
posts. These attacks on Taliban infrastructure started on October 7, 2001 and lasted for 
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approximately three weeks, even though the number of new targets had dwindled and 
most of the missions were “re-strikes” by the end of those first few weeks. There simply 
weren’t that many fixed, strategic targets available, and CENTCOM’s rules governing 
battle damage assessment (BDA) required satellite imagery verification of target 
destruction. Absence of such BDA—as was the case when poor weather obscured 
satellite visibility—meant the target went back on the prioritized strike list. Fixed 
targeting persisted in this manner, even though the CFACC, Lieutenant General Wald 
would later recount that he believed the air campaign had reached its objectives 
“…within the first fifteen minutes or so” (Lambeth, 2005). 
 After 11 days of aerial attack against fixed targets, the DoD announced the 
official shift from fixed targets to targets of opportunity. By October 16, Northern 
Alliance leadership was requesting Americans shift their aerial targeting to Taliban front 
line troops, instead of re-striking airfields. However, by the end of October, B-52 crews 
were dropping bombs on the front line Taliban troops at the direction of small teams of 
special operations forces and their Northern Alliance counterparts (Theisen, 2003).  
While the bombers’ effects were deadly, the initial coordination between ground 
controller and bomber crew—who had no visual means by which to positively verify 
friendly or target position—was sometimes problematic. Even among aircrews who 
trained routinely with CAS coordination procedures, errors were made, such as the F/A-
18 that dropped a Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM—a GPS-aided 2,000 pound 
bomb) too close to a friendly position during the battle at Qala-i-Jangi prison (Lambeth, 
2005). 
It was the combination of few remaining fixed targets and the existence of the 
GPS-guided JDAM that enabled B-1 and B-52 crews to support the ground campaign so 
effectively in the early phases of OEF. Bombers had the persistence to loiter for hours 
awaiting targets, while the JDAM did not require favorable weather conditions on the 
ground as other precision weapons did, but was still precise enough to inspire confidence 
among those on the ground relying on its effects to influence the enemy. Whereas in the 
aftermath of Vietnam and Desert Storm, the CAS mission was largely forgotten by the 
bomber community, the experience of OEF appears different. During an initial “lessons 
  105
learned” conference in 2002, the ad-hoc nature of the bomber/terminal controller 
coordination was addressed, and the outcome was a recommendation for the bomber 
community to fully adopt the joint CAS doctrine and modify its tactical employment 
manuals to incorporate CAS procedures. Another recommendation was for minor 
changes to be made to the joint CAS procedures and publication to better accommodate 
the employment of bombers and their coordinate-seeking weapons (Theisen, 2003).  
10. Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) 
The USAF declared its GBU-39, better known as the “small-diameter bomb” 
(SDB) initially operational capable (IOC) in October 2006 (Wicke, 2006). The new 250-
pound bomb was designed to provide a precise, lower-yield effect than existing 500- and 
2,000-lb. variants. While this weapon will prove useful in support of urban combat 
operations in Iraq, its existence stems from a concept generated in 1998, well before the 
U.S. was engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom. The SDB will eventually be 
employed from numerous USAF aircraft, but the only one capable at the time of this 
writing is the F-15E (Wicke, 2006). 
11. Armed UAVs 
The USAF and CIA had jointly used the Predator unmanned air vehicle (UAV) to 
monitor the conflict in the Balkans, dating back as far at 1995 (Cooter, 2007). The 
program remained limited, employing small numbers of aircraft to track forces and 
military equipment. It was not until Operation Allied Force in 1999 that the utility of the 
Predator for identifying real-time targets for strikes by fighter aircraft followed by 
immediate BDA—all fed directly to the Air Operations Center—become apparent. While 
the Predator proved useful during Allied Force, the USAFE commander, Lieutenant 
General John Jumper, viewed some of the missions as missed opportunities, as the 
Predator was able to identify Serbian vehicles and military forces, but was unable to 
engage them (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). Additionally, the coordination process to hand 
off the Predator’s target to an attack aircraft proved difficult to execute due to the 
limitations of the systems in place at the time.  
  106
Because of his frustrations during Allied Force, General Jumper insisted the 
USAF develop the capability to employ weapons from the Predator, and in his next 
capacity as the commander of Air Combat Command, he personally oversaw the program 
to do so (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). However, the service’s prevailing view at the time 
was that arming a reconnaissance drone capable of the flight performance of the Predator 
could be in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The 
Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force had to first satisfy their own legal staffs 
that they were indeed in compliance with INF before employing an armed Predator. 
The details surrounding just which organization—the USAF or the CIA—funded 
the arming of the Predator conflict in the source literature (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). 
What is well reported is that testing of the armed version began in the summer of 2001, 
while unarmed Predators were tracking Bin Laden and al-Qaeda operatives under the 
direction of the CIA. Further debate occurred between the Director of the CIA, George 
Tenet, and his own staff about whether or not the Agency had the legal authority to “pull 
the trigger” on Bin Laden using a piece of military hardware like the Predator. As the 
debates and funding discussions persisted, the trial Predator deployment to Afghanistan 
ended. The September 11 attacks effectively negated the remaining debate, as both armed 
and unarmed Predators returned to the skies over Afghanistan.  
Eventually, the USAF pursued arming all of its Predators. Additionally, the severe 
limitations of the Predator’s weapons payload (two Hellfire missiles) prompted the 
initiation of a larger airframe variant, capable of carrying more weapons. This concept 
was pursued by the USAF in 2001 and later became the MQ-9 “Reaper,” which was 
declared IOC in October 2007 ("USAF Factsheets: MQ-9," 2008). As of this writing, 
Reaper is fully employed in Afghanistan, and the U.S. Army has fielded its own armed 
UAV variant, the MQ-1C “Sky Warrior” (Tirpak, 2007).   
12. Advanced Targeting Pods 
For years, the Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared for Night 
(LANTIRN) pod was the state of the art. Since it entered service in 1987, LANTIRN 
provided the F-16 and F-15E crews with the ability to precisely navigate and target at low 
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altitude and at nighttime, providing a significant advantage during ground-attack and pre-
planned bombing missions ("USAF Factsheet: LANTIRN," 2007). The next generation 
targeting pod was built for the Israeli Air Force by the Rafael Corporation, and was called 
the LITENING I. LITENING I offered improved infrared camera resolution, and 
Northrop Grumman partnered with them to produce the LITENING II, which was fielded 
on American fighter aircraft in 1999 ("USAF Factsheet: LITENING AT," 2007). 
Improvements were made to LITENING II, to include a daylight-capable TV 
camera, a laser marker, and improved night imaging using mid-wave infrared sensors. 
Several improved variants were fielded and remain in service on the USAF’s A-10, B-52, 
F-15E, and F-16, as well as the several other services and coalition partner aircraft 
(USAF Factsheet: LITENING AT, 2007). During Operation Enduring Freedom, targeting 
pod-equipped fighters proved extremely capable of identifying both friendly and enemy 
positions at night.  
Advanced targeting pods also provided a night-vision goggle compatible laser 
marker, which allowed aircrew and ground controllers to “point” out targets and 
references to one another, thereby minimizing communications and confusion. Initially, 
only the F-15E and the F-16 employed the advanced targeting pod (Lambeth, 2005). 
After it proved extremely useful in both the strike and reconnaissance capacities, pods 
began steadily showing up on an increasing number of coalition aircraft, to include the B-
52 and B-1, the latter of which completed its first combat weapons drop using the 
SNIPER XR advanced targeting pod in August, 2008. Perhaps the most beneficial aspect 
of equipping strike assets with advanced targeting pods is the ability to transmit the 
streaming video the crew is seeing in the cockpit to the terminal controller on the ground, 
who is ultimately responsible for ensuring the aircraft is attacking the correct target. 
13. Man-Portable UAVs 
There are dozens of models of man-portable UAVs in use in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. DARPA originally sponsored early projects in the mid-1990s, and the U.S. 
Army purchased a handful in 1999. Since then, the concept has grown to the extent that 
nearly every service has its own variants, which are managed by their respective service’s 
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“battlelab” organization. The ease with these systems are procured combined with the 
limited over-the-horizon capability guarantee they will continue to be employed by 
American, coalition, and perhaps enemy forces. 
D. ANALYSIS 
As in the previous analyses, the effect of each change is categorized as either 
“major” or “minor.” A change is assessed as having a “major” effect if the results of the 
implementation of that change: (1) improve the strategic situation, (2) positively reverse 
the course of a failing operation or campaign, or (3) enable a previously unobtainable 
objective, strategy, or tactic. Otherwise, the change is assessed as “minor” (See Table 
15). 
Changes in the form of modifications to existing equipment, concepts, tactics, 
etc., are considered “incremental.” Changes that create previously unemployed tactics, 
implement a wholly new military  application for technology, or define a new means by 
which to wage war are all considered “transformational.” This includes the instances 
where the U.S. military emulated another military. All others are labeled “incremental.”  
Table 15.   Level of Effects and Nature of Changes  
 Nature of Change 




HMMWV Armor Modifications 
Stryker 
Advanced Targeting Pods 
Small Diameter Bomb  
Armed UAVs 












Major Counter-Scud Task Force 
MRAP 
Joint IED Defeat Organization 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine 
1Observed effectiveness to date, not predicted effectiveness relative to outcome 
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Of the changes made at the strategic level, civilian intervention provides a greater 
explanatory power. In the case of the JIEDDO, commanders in the combat theater 
requested assistance, but the first iteration of the organization floundered a bit under the 
Department of the Army, as it did not have the authority to direct other services’ 
participation. It was not until the JIEDDO reported to the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
and had a substantial budget that it was able to make significant headway in the effort to 
counter the IED threat.  
In the instance of the Human Terrain System, there is evidence that the decision 
to field a “trial team” for the concept was actually the product of a successful civilian-
military cooperation, when the combined arms center at Ft. Leavenworth proposed 
implementing the ideas put forth by Dr. McFate. While a civilian did articulate the 
concept, there is no evidence that the civilian leadership of the military had to force the 
the army to adopt the concept. The idea of a small beginning, such as the deployment of a 
single pilot team, appears to have been met without much resistance—particularly as the 
need was easily articulated and the cost of such a venture was relatively low.  
While these two change samples effectively point to equal explanatory power for 
product champion and civilian intervention, the samples also indicate that an idea 
initially proposed on a small scale (i.e., small team with little to no budget) may be less 
likely to encounter resistance from service competitors and therefore be more likely to 
succeed, but only if the demonstration can be shown as unambiguously successful. 
 
 Product Champion Civilian Intervention 
Joint IED Defeat Organization  X 
Human Terrain System X  
Table 16.   OEF/OIF Strategic-Level Changes. 
 
The changes initiated at the operational level—where campaigns and major 
operations are managed—primarily followed the planned model. In each case, an 
individual or group was assigned to a unique problem set and worked out a concept for a 
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solution before implementation. In the case of TST doctrine, individuals working within 
the concerned organizations evolved their warfighting organization and procedures over 
time, and after examining operational failures. Thus, the TST capability as a tool of the 
combatant commander was in effect a planned process; the final form, where it became 
an effective tool—one capable of thwarting Scud launches and delivering ordnance on 
coordinates within minutes of retasking—evolved after much trial, error, and adjustment. 
The explanatory power of the planned hypothesis must be tempered, however, by 
the fact that in each of these instances, ample existing data was available regarding past 
approaches to the problems. In the case of the counter-Scud task force and TST 
operations, planners had the experiences of Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force to 
examine for applicable lessons, of which there were many. In the case of 
counterinsurgency doctrine, there existed the widely documented difficulties of the Army 
and Marines from 2003-7, as well as numerous written accounts of historical 
insurgencies. This is not to take anything away from the successful change agents 
involved in these samples, but rather to highlight the practice of relevant history being 
analyzed and its lessons applied to future military operations—with great effect.  
 
 Planned Emergent 
Counter-Scud Task Force X  
Counterinsurgency Doctrine X  
TST X X 
Table 17.   OEF/OIF Operational-Level Changes 
 
Of the tactical-level changes, both bomber CAS tactics and non-traditional ISR 
resulted from individual tactical units responding to the conditions of the conflict at the 
time. The strategic bombers effectively ran out of fixed targets at about the time small 
numbers of special operations forces were introduced into Afghanistan. The NTISR 
mission was a direct result of targeting pod-equipped tactical aircraft “on call” following 
the end of major combat operations. Though there was some initial resistance to being 
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officially tasked to do reconnaissance, in the absence of being able to expend ordnance, 
there was little else of value to contribute while waiting for tasking.   
 
 Decentralization High Casualties or Mission Failure 
Bomber CAS X  
NTISR X  
Table 18.   OEF/OIF Tactical-Level Changes 
 
The technological changes examined that occurred during OEF and OIF reflect 
two persistent themes: force protection and finding/killing the enemy from the air. Of the 
seven technological changes (See Table 19), three were found to have been initiated 
before the attacks of September 11, and were therefore considered products of the 
existing procurement system at the time. Depending on when the first armed Predator 
drone was actually employed with the intent to engage targets (the unclassified literature 
maintains it wasn’t until after September 11, 2001), one could point to the fact that the 
concept of the armed UAV was undergoing test development in 2000, and therefore 
represents some form of the existing procurement system. It also makes sense to classify 
it as a response to a combat need because the concept met with such initial resistance 
from the Department of Defense that it might never have been employed in its armed 
capacity outside of war.  
The paths by which the other four combat needs came into service suggest there 
are two distinct methods by which to force technological changes during wartime: “do-it-
yourself,” or to create outside pressure at the top of the organization. In the instance of 
the HMMWV armor modifications, individual units simply responded very appropriately 
and quickly to the tangible need for better protection while patrolling the streets of Iraq. 
As casualties increased, so did public outcry. Stories of homemade HMMWV armor kits 
and individually purchased body armor prompted congressional hearings at which DoD 
leadership was called to account for its failure to adequately protect its troops. It was this 
congressional pressure that snapped DoD leadership out of the inaction created by belief 
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the U.S. wouldn’t be in Iraq much longer—an example of the “unfreezing” stage Lewin 
(1948) describes. Effectively, what started out as the do-it-yourself approach ended up 
creating the pressure for change at the top—the appropriate level where the resources 
required to fix the situation resided. 
The route by which the U.S. military purchased the MRAP follows almost exactly 
the same pattern. On the other hand, the procurement of small UAVs went largely 
unregulated until they became so widely proliferated that concerns about deconfliction 
with airbase traffic and helicopter flight routes prompted a measure of scrutiny. Even 
now, the services are still trying to figure out which organization, if any, should be 
responsible for standardizing these systems across the services and integrating them into 
joint doctrine. These instances of change indicate perhaps the two alternating hypotheses 
proposed earlier may only partially explain technological change; it appears the existence 
of product champions and decentralization—much like strategic- and tactical-level 









Table 19.   OEF/OIF Technological Changes 
 
 Combat Need Procurement Inertia 
Stryker  X 
HMMWV Armor Mods X  
MRAP X  
Small UAVs X  
Advanced Targeting Pods  X 
Small Diameter Bomb  X 
Armed UAVs X X 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. THE EXPLANATORY POWERS OF THE HYPOTHESES 
The results of each preceding case are combined here to present a longitudinal 
view of change at each level of warfare. Because many of these changes are similar and 
related to one another, they do not represent truly independent observations. It would be 
misleading to present a quantitative analysis. Therefore, the results from each case are 
combined in order to make general, qualitative assessments regarding the hypothesis for 
change across the conflicts as well as the variations between them. In addition, following 
the assessment of the relative explanatory power of each hypothesis, several observations 
regarding specific changes are presented to help clarify those overall assessments. 
1. Strategic-Level Change 
Analysis of he strategic-level changes presented in this study support the 
hypothesis that the product champion wields greater influence at the strategic level of 
war. But they also indicate that civilian intervention has played an increasingly important 
role in more recent conflicts (See Table 20). Perhaps what is most striking about this data 
set is the imbalance between significant strategic-level changes made during each of the 
three conflicts.  
World War II and Vietnam exhibited numerous instances of change, though many 
of them were the creation of new organizations in response to unique challenges that 
could not be met by the existing force. Vietnam exhibits the greatest number of doctrinal 
changes. Most significantly, OEF/OIF exhibit two changes: the creation of unique task-
organizations in response to specific battlefield deficiencies. Recently, it has proven 
difficult to make strategic-level changes.  
What this ultimately suggests is the ability to make strategic-level change may 
require not one but both components: a military product champion enabled by agreeable 
civilian leadership. Civilian leadership always possesses the power to veto or alter a 
change proposed by the military. The instances of change observed in this study may be  
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better explained by either the existence of the previously mentioned civilian intervention 
or the combination of a product champion and an agreeable (or at least non-hostile) 
civilian leadership.  
 
Strategic-Level Changes Product Champion 
Civilian 
Intervention 
Daylight Precision Bombing X  
OSS X X 
Marine Raiders X X 
Long-Range Escort Fighters  X 
OSRD X  
Mounted Cavalry   








Air Commandos X  
B-52 Conventional  Bombing X  
Search-and-Destroy X  
SEALs  X 
Herbicidal Warfare  X 
Aerial Mining  X 






“Large Unit” Operations X X 







Human Terrain System X  
Table 20.   Summary of Strategic-Level Changes 
 
2. Operational-Level Change 
The selected instances of operational-level change indicate the planned change 
hypothesis holds the greater explanatory power. However, a shift from emergent is 
apparent between the data for World War II and Vietnam (See Table 21). Upon closer 
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look, one notices that nearly half of the numerous planned changes identified during 
Vietnam were organizational—and closely related at that. The riverine, coastal, and 
amphibious task forces all had their origins within the Bucklew Report, the Navy’s study 
initiated to determine how best it could contribute to the counterinsurgency effort.  
More telling are the changes in doctrine. During World War II, all of the 
operational-level doctrinal changes emerged; they came into being through the iterative, 
purposive actions of fielded units that, in most instances, exhibited single-loop learning 
(error corrective) behaviors. In practical terms, they tried, examined, corrected, and tried 
again. The results of numerous iterations became the official, recorded doctrine of the 
services at the end of the war. However, during Vietnam only one doctrinal change can 
be condsidered emergent—SEAD. SEAD doctrine is unique because it was highly 
dependent on the political constraints put on the series of bombing campaigns. SEAD 
emerged as a battle of reactive aircraft using missiles and electrons because pre-emptive 
targeting of Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missile sites was prohibited, largely to ensure 
the Soviet Union was kept from directly entering the war. 
The remainder were undertaken as intentional, planned efforts. The marine 
raiding concept remained unchanged from its inception, but was abandoned when empty 
beach after empty beach was raided in search of the elusive enemy rallying points, as the 
enemy had responded by shifting operations further inland. The Navy’s brown-water 
doctrine was well-conceived from early on in the conflict, and though it changed with the 
addition of new technological capabilities and innovative concepts for projecting force 
farther into the inland waterways (such as the Advanced Tactical Support Base), little 
change was required to the fundamental principles.  
Vertical envelopment persisted in a similar manner, not for the soundness of its 
concept but for the perceived lack of a viable alternative. The army had “proven” the 
airmobile concept to itself through the test and evaluation of the 11th Air Assault 
Division (Test) prior to the war. Although changes did occur to helicopter operations, 
they took the incremental form of improving firepower and coordination. The airmobile 
concept remained fundamentally unchanged from the initial lift of South Vietnamese 
troops in December 1962, until the large-scale withdrawal of American combat troops. 
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The doctrinal changes selected from OEF and OIF are both of the planned variety. 
TST doctrine was developed deliberately following Operation Allied Force, and it was 
specifically planned for at the outset of OEF. It just was not nearly as effective as it could 
have been, and therefore ended up exhibiting emergent characteristics as well. The reader 
might recall that there was no formal joint definition of what exactly a “time-sensitive” 
target was much less inter-service agreement about just how to go about killing one 
quickly. Opportunities for improvement were identified and subsequently implemented. 
The other example, the counterinsurgency doctrine implemented by General Petraeus in 
2007, was also a carefully studied and planned event. 
 
Operational-Level Changes Planned Emergent 
Amphibious Operations Doctrine  X 
ASW Doctrine  X 
ASWORG X  







Combined Arms Doctrine  X 
Marine ARG/SLF Raiding X  
TF 115 X  
TF 116 X  
TF 117 X  
TF 194 X  
SEAD Doctrine  X 






Vertical Envelopment X  
Counter-Scud Task Force X  







TST X X 
Table 21.   Summary of Operational-Level Changes 
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Therein lays a dichotomy regarding operational-level change. On the surface, 
emergent change appears to be the overwhelming way of earlier American conflict, 
characterized by the trial-and-error iterations of World War II. However, the more recent 
preponderance of planned changes persisting through to the end of a conflict does not 
indicate whether it is a positive development; it only demonstrates that changes—
particularly doctrinal—are less likely to occur once the U.S. is at war. Success is 
therefore highly dependent on the assumptions about and understanding of the enemy at 
the outset of hostilities.  
3.  Tactical-Level Change 
Changes made at the tactical level of war are overwhelmingly characterized by 
the decentralized nature of the command relationships in place. However, 
decentralization alone is not sufficient to bring about needed changes. During World War 
II, the two tactical-level changes analyzed were implemented under a decentralized 
command—individual units were either free to make changes on their own, or far enough 
removed from higher headquarters that they made changes that otherwise might not be 
approved (as was the case of General LeMay unilaterally deciding to firebomb Japanese 
cities). However, another factor acted as a catalyst for change. During both the hedgerow 
campaign and the bombing effort against the Japanese mainland, units had to first 
experience mission failure before implementing change. 
During Vietnam, the catalyst present, alongside the implementation of the 
Civilian Irregular Defense Group and the Combined Action Platoons, was the simple lack 
of resources with which to carry out the assigned missions. The units implementing these 
changes were quite simply forced into developing creative solutions to tactical problems. 
In OEF and OIF, both the bomber force’s change to the CAS role and the implementation 
of the NTISR mission by fighter aircraft were attributable to the exhaustion of fixed, pre-
planned targets and weapons-employment missions in general.  
It is noteworthy that in each instance of tactical-level change analyzed as part of 
this study, the impacts of the changes on the overall war effort were largely positive. 
Equally noteworthy is the fact that those tactical-level changes studied for both Vietnam 
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and OEF/OIF were viewed as ancillary (at least initially). During Vietnam, they were 
considered a waste of combat power. During OEF/OIF, they were something else to do 
for the war effort once the “real” mission was over. The tactical-level changes assessed 
here suggest the American approach to warfare largely produces positive effects, but 
requires a catalyst in addition to a decentralized command structure. 
 
Tactical-Level Changes Decentralization Casualties / Failure 
Hedgerow Combat 
Modifications X X 









Incendiary Bombing X X 






CAPs X  







NTISR X  
Table 22.   Summary of Tactical-Level Changes 
 
4. Technological Change 
Technological changes made during World War II indicate internal processes that 
were highly responsive to the needs of frontline combat troops. Each and every 
technological change had as its origin a specific combat need. However, procurement 
inertia did exist. In the three instances where it was present, pre-existing systems fit the 
requirements of combat. In fact, the establishment of organizations dedicated to 
harnessing and implementing cutting-edge technology at an accelerated pace, such as the 
OSRD and ASWORG, generally guaranteed it. 
The same cannot be said of the technological changes made during Vietnam. Of 
particular note is the quite unintentional adoption of the M16 rifle by the Army. To 
further complicate matters, procurement inertia does not always result in ill-suited 
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equipment being forced upon reluctant troops. The example of the first laser-guided 
bombs is evidence that industry and those who are far removed from the battlefield can 
conceive of useful technology—it will just be exceedingly difficult to field it if a 
competing system exists, even if that system is less effective and more costly. 
Technological Changes Combat Need Procurement Inertia 
SONAR X X 
HF/DF Systems X  
S-band  RADAR X  
Norden Bombsight X X 
Parachute / Glider X X 
Unmanned Bombers X  








Specialized Landing Craft X  
M113 ACAV X  
M16  X 
“Swift” boat X  
AH-1 X  
ATSB X  






Laser-Guided Bombs  X 
Stryker  X 
HMMWV Armor Mods X  
MRAP X  
Man-Portable UAVs X  
Advanced Targeting Pods  X 







Armed UAVs X X 
Table 23.    Summary of Technological Changes 
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Furthermore, the technological changes introduced during OEF/OIF split fairly 
evenly between combat need and procurement inertia. Moreover, with history continuing 
to be written on a daily basis, it is too early to make definitive statements about the nature 
of technological change during these conflicts. However, the initial data indicates that 
newly developed weapons systems will be fielded to “fit” the needs of the conflict. 
B. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT WARTIME CHANGE 
During the course of this study, several consistencies, or “themes” repeated 
throughout the individual instances of change. They are presented here not as definitive 
statements, but rather as suggestions for thinking about how future military change—be it 
strategic, operational, tactical, or technological—might be enabled, accelerated, or 
derailed. 
1. Artificiality of the Hypothetical Distinctions  
Even though the initial hypotheses proposed at the beginning of this study were 
set up as an “either / or” condition, many changes exhibited both aspects. Furthermore, 
the distinction between levels of warfare was (as previously admitted) an artificial 
construct designed to isolate the underlying conditions that influenced the decisions made 
regarding each change. Just as artificial is the division of the hypotheses by level; for 
example, there can be and indeed have been numerous examples of civilian intervention 
at the lower levels (operational and tactical) of war and in forcing technological change. 
During Vietnam, President Johnson interjected his views into nearly every aspect of the 
conflict—often resulting in detrimental impacts to military operations.  
2. The Power of Product Champions and Civilian Intervention  
Likewise, a product champion can exist at any level, and often does. A sometimes 
decisive factor in whether or not the product champion will succeed or fail is whether or 
not he can convince the strategic-level decision makers, both civilian and military 
leadership alike, of the merits of his concept. This is particularly true concerning 
technological systems that conflict with a service’s established order. For example, the 
procurement of the MRAP required military members to circumvent chains of command 
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and in a few instances, to request direct congressional intervention. This pattern also existed 
during World War II, when OSRD Director Vannevar Bush had to end-run the Chief of 
Naval Operations in order to get his much-needed improvements implemented. It even 
showed up again during Vietnam, as General Westmoreland privately lobbied an eager 
President Johnson to send large numbers of conventional combat troops. 
3.  Demonstration in Combat   
One reliable means by which to force military change exists with convincing the 
civilian leadership of the merits of an idea or concept, and thereby instigating civilian-
directed change. One way to accomplish this is through the demonstration of the system or 
concept in combat conditions. During World War II, a fully mobilized military industrial 
complex was harnessed effectively by the nation’s leading scientists in the form of the 
OSRD. They studied problems at the ground level, and then proposed solutions that were 
assessed in the combat theater. During Vietnam, even though the USAF wanted nothing to do 
with a laser-guided bomb, one product champion was able to successfully keep the program 
on life support long enough to get it fielded with an F-4 squadron flying combat mission in 
Southeast Asia. Only after the tangible results (not to mention the rave reviews of the pilots 
and ground controllers) in the form of BDA existed did the service see the merits of that 
system. 
It is worth noting here that the effect of a combat demonstration appears to be so 
powerful that even a failed demonstration can provide serve to perpetuate an idea long past 
its prime. An example of this is the unmanned bomber concept, which was introduced into 
the combat theater without achieving a single positive result. The program persisted through 
over a dozen mission failures and the deaths of several crewmembers, largely due to its 
perceived potential merit in the minds of those who authorized it. 
Finally, the relevance of the demonstration principle is not limited to technical or 
weapons systems. During Vietnam, both the CAP and the CIDG concepts began with small-
scale proofs-of-concept trials, and eventually spread outward. However, the difference in 
these two changes was the fact that neither COMUSMACV nor the  military leadership in the 
Pentagon was ever convinced of the successes achieved by CAPs and CIDG.    
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4. Summary 
This study proposed that significant changes made by the U.S. military during 
wartime should be assessed in the context of the appropriate level of warfare at which the 
change was initiated. Additionally, it treated change as not simply a difference between 
two static states, but rather as a process. In understanding the process by which change 
occurred, the driving factors and underlying conditions could be identified. This method 
of analysis proved effective in deriving several general insights into wartime change and 
the U.S. military. 
First, at the strategic level, a military product champion is more likely to bring 
about change than civilian intervention. However, if one looks only at the two more 
recent conflicts, it is apparent that both product champions and civilian interventions 
have become equally important factors. At the operational level, planned changes have 
recently become much more prevalent. This development indicates a more methodical 
approach to addressing the need for change has developed.  
At the tactical level, decentralized command relationships result in change—as 
one would logically expect. However, equally important is another factor—different in 
each instance—that acted as a “catalyst” to enable the change to occur. The catalysts 
present in the samples examined in this study were: previous mission failures, lack of 
resources, and absence of “traditional” mission necessity. It is noteworthy that in all six 
instances where decentralization enabled change, the resulting change effectively 
achieved what the initiators set out to accomplish. 
Finally, technological changes are largely made in response to combat needs. 
Procurement inertia can and does still cause pre-existing weapons systems to be applied 
to combat needs, but the data shows that during more recent conflicts, if the pre-existing 
weapon system experiences problems, it will generally be modified or replaced—such 
has not always been the case in the past. Hopefully, this new-found responsiveness to 
emerging problems will persist in the future.      
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